Re: Et en Russie !

[Александр]

La Russie dénonce des « pressions » des services spéciaux sur ses diplomates aux USA

Le ministère russe des Affaires étrangères a dénoncé mardi des « pressions » sur son personnel diplomatique aux Etats-Unis de la part des services spéciaux américains, en les accusant de multiplier les « tentatives de recrutement » de diplomates russes. « La situation autour des diplomates russes aux Etats-Unis ne cesse de s’empirer », a déclaré un vice-ministre russe des Affaires étrangères, Sergueï Riabkov, en affirmant que depuis deux ans et demi, les tentatives de Washington de les recruter comme agents de renseignement « se sont nettement multipliées ».

« Les services spéciaux américains ne se gênent pas de recourir aux moyens de pression les plus misérables, en allant jusqu’à menacer la santé des membres de famille » des diplomates russes, a affirmé M. Riabkov.

 Il a également dénoncé des « entraves artificielles » et des « restrictions inventées », qui « perturbent » selon lui le fonctionnement des représentations diplomatiques russes aux Etats-Unis.

 Sergueï Riabkov a par ailleurs accusé Washington de mener « des activités d’espionnage intenses » en Russie « sous couvert diplomatique », en affirmant notamment que des officiers dépendant de l’attaché militaire américain à Moscou étaient souvent vus près des sites militaires stratégiques russes.

 Les tensions ne cessent de monter entre Moscou et Washington depuis l’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie en 2014 et le début du conflit dans l’est de l’Ukraine.

 La Russie et les Etats-Unis, dont les relations n’avaient connu de telle crise depuis l’époque de la Guerre froide, sont également en proie à des désaccords profonds sur le règlement de la crise syrienne.

Si on parlait des (plus que) pressions russes sur les diplomates us?

Retour au goulag:

Russie : Retour des travaux forcés dès 2017

Dès le 1^er janvier 2017, les travaux forcés, remis aux goûts du jour, seront de nouveau une réalité au sein du système judiciaire russe. Le pays s’apprête en effet à ouvrir onze établissements dédiés.


(Photo Flickr/ Gilbert-Noël Sfeir Mont-Liban)

Au bagne. Les travaux forcés (NDLR, détention couplée de travail obligatoire), une peine criminelle de droit commun dont l’évocation rappelle en France les jours les plus sombres des bagnes de Guyane ou de Nouvelle-Calédonie. Ce n’est guère mieux en Russie, où l’horreur des conditions d’internement dans les goulags et multiples prisons de l’Union soviétique n’a pas encore disparu des mémoires.
Pourtant, le système judiciaire russe s’apprête bel et bien à réintroduire ce type de peine dès 2017, comme le rapporte un récent article du Moscow Times. Le tout sous une nouvelle appellation, politiquement plus correcte : travaux correctionnels. Sept infrastructures et quatre centres correctionnels dédiés devraient ainsi ouvrir leur porte le 1^er janvier prochain. Leur capacité d’hébergement est estimée à 900 prisonniers.

Valery Maximenko, le directeur adjoint des services pénitenciers fédéraux russes, a récemment expliqué dans une interview accordée à TAR-TASS, l’une des principales agences de presse de Russie, qu’il ne fallait rien y voir d’autre qu’une « nouvelle alternative à la privation de liberté ». À l’en croire, cette peine, qu’il compare à la situation des travailleurs de quarts vivant et travaillant loin de leur famille, aurait l’avantage de « ne pas complètement isoler les prisonniers de la société ». L’homme est catégorique : ce serait une « absurdité » de suggérer que la réintroduction des travaux forcés inaugure un retour à l’ère du goulag.

« Je vous assure que, malgré le label « travaux forcés », cette punition revêt un caractère d’ordre social », se justifie-t-il auprès de l’agence de presse, avant d’ajouter que les autorités ont étudié « les meilleurs aspects de l’expérience soviétique ». Des propos qui doivent faire se retourner Alexandre Soljenitsyne dans sa tombe.

Les travaux correctionnels ont été inclus dans le Code pénal russe fin 2011. Cependant, leur entrée en vigueur aura demandé quelques années, le temps de faire sortir de terre des centres adaptés. Les autorités russes expliquent que les mesures de sécurité en vigueur dans ces établissements seront différentes de celles qui existent actuellement dans les établissements correctionnels du pays.

Ainsi, les détenus seront par exemple autorisés à sortir du bâtiment, sous réserve d’une permission de l’administration. De plus, à l’inverse des autres prisonniers, les détenus de ces centres pourront également avoir accès à Internet, ainsi qu’à des téléphones portables. Un salaire, imposable, leur sera également versé. Enfin, ils bénéficieront de 18 jours de congés payés annuels après avoir passé plus de six mois dans l’établissement. En revanche, ces héritiers d’Ivan Denissovitch n’auront pas le droit de choisir ou de refuser le travail qui leur sera assigné.

Et:

Le Kremlin s’en prend à l’ONG russe Memorial

La principale organisation de défense des droits humains a annoncé mardi avoir été enregistrée en tant qu’«agent de l’étranger» par la justice russe.

La principale organisation de défense des droits humains en Russie, Memorial International, a annoncé mardi avoir été enregistrée en tant qu’«agent de l’étranger» par la justice russe. La position de l’ONG face au conflit en Ukraine a semble-t-il froissé le Kremlin.

L’ONG a reçu «un document du ministère de la justice la classant ‘agent de l’étranger'», a confirmé le président de cette ONG, Arseni Roguinski. Le ministère a justifié sa décision en listant les déclarations de l’organisation critiquant les autorités russes, pour «prouver que Memorial International a une activité politique tout en bénéficiant d’un financement étranger», a-t-il précisé.

«Activité politique»

La justice a notamment estimé que Memorial International, en critiquant certaines lois russes ou en parlant d’«agression» de la Russie contre l’Ukraine, a fait preuve d’activité politique.

Six antennes régionales de Memorial avaient déjà été qualifiées d’«agents de l’étranger» par la justice russe, dont celles de Moscou, Saint-Pétersbourg et Ekaterinbourg, tandis que Memorial International, qui chapeaute une soixantaine de filiales, avait été jusqu’ici épargnée.

Créée fin 1989 par le dissident et prix Nobel de la Paix Andreï Sakharov, Memorial se consacre à l’étude des répressions à l’époque soviétique et à la défense des droits humains dans l’ex-URSS où elle a ses antennes.

Relents staliniens

En 2012, la Russie avait voté une loi obligeant les ONG qui reçoivent un financement étranger et ont une «activité politique» à s’enregistrer en tant qu’«agent de l’étranger» et à s’afficher en tant que tel dans toute communication ou activité publiques.

Le terme d’«agent de l’étranger» était appliqué à l’époque stalinienne aux opposants réels ou supposés, mais il était aussi employé par les autorités soviétiques dans les années 1970-80 pour qualifier les dissidents accusés d’être à la solde de l’Occident.

Cette loi a été complétée par une autre signée en mai par Vladimir Poutine qui permet de désigner des organisations étrangères actives en Russie comme «indésirables». Elles peuvent ensuite être interdites, qu’il s’agisse d’ONG, de fondations ou d’entreprises.

[benoit77]

Russie : Retour des travaux forcés dès 2017

M'étonne pas!
ça fait 2 ans que je dis que la Russie retourne aux heures les plus sombres de son histoire.
Tant pis pour les russes , ils fallait qu'ils s'insurgent dés l'envoi des petits hommes verts en Crimée début 2014.

Ils ont mis le doigt dans un engrenage mortifère. La propagande clamant "le même pas mal" ne changera rien au résultat final.
ils n'ont pas voulu s'amputer du doigt en 2014.
A eux de voir s'ils veulent se couper la main maintenant.
ou s'arracher le bras dans 2 ans car au rythme actuel je vois bien l'annulation/suppression des élections de 2018 et la ré-instauration  du politburo de Russie-unie pour le centième anniversaire de la naissance du politburo soviétique !

[Matt]

Je pense plutôt aux deux bras à s'arracher . . . 

[Александр]

Russia to complicate procedure for obtaining visas for Ukrainians – Klimkin



Russia will try to complicate the procedure for obtaining visas for Ukrainians in the event of introduction of a visa regime between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin said this to reporters after the government’s meeting, an Ukrinform correspondent reported.

"We understand that in case of introduction of visa regime, Russia will try to complicate the procedure for obtaining visas, maybe offering some form of citizenship," Klimkin said.

He believes that it is necessary to examine all the risks that may arise in the event of introduction of visa regime.

Moralité:

La rada considère d'établir un régime de visa pour les russes

Pas possible de copier l'article de ZIK.ua

Putin’s plutonium threat ‘tactically clever but strategically disastrous,’ Solovey says

La menace de Poutine sur le plutonium est "tactiquement habile mais stratégiquement désastreuse», dit Solovey

Vladimir Putin’s ultimatum to the West over the plutonium issue may be “tactically clever” on his part largely for domestic reasons, MGIMO professor Valeriy Solovey says; but it is “strategically disastrous” because it undermines much of what he has been claiming and reinforces the commitment of the West to stand up to him.





Valeriy Solovey



In a post on the Kasparov.ru portal, the commentator makes six points in support of his general contention:

• As he has so often before, Putin has issued an ultimatum that his opponents do not know immediately how to answer. That allows him to portray them domestically as weak and gives him room for maneuver.
  
• The timing of his latest move coincides with a period during which “the departing American administration already doesn’t want to do anything, and the new one will not appear anytime soon.”
  
• “At the strategic eve, Russia confirms its reputation as an extremely unpredictable country.”
  
• The demand for compensation from the West, however, undercuts Putin’s own claims that sanctions haven’t harmed Russia.
  
• This verbal escalation does not necessarily point to a real one, especially since one can always play Russian roulette with confidence if the gun isn’t loaded.
  
• This foreign policy escalation is incompatible with Russia’s need for reforms, “but on the other hand it is perfectly in step with the militaristic psychosis … the increasingly harsh domestic political arrangements and other aspects of a semi-mobilized economy.”
  
  

Many other Russian commentators are also discussing this issue today. Two of the most insightful are Ilya Milshteyn on the Grani portal and Andrey Piontkovsky on Kyiv’s Apostrophe one.




Ilya Milshteyn



It is clear, Milshteyn writes, that Putin is engaged in blackmail and has raised the stakes to the nuclear level. But it is also clear that the West isn’t now ready to give in and do what he wants. In fact, by issuing such a declaration, Putin has “sent a signal that he has forever lost his connection with reality.”





The tragedy is that this is not Putin’s problem: it is the world’s problem because he has the capacity to destroy the world. And even if few think he is prepared to go that far, his retention of the plutonium raises two disturbing questions: is he going to build more bombs? And is he going to give some of it to other world outcasts. Both are a threat to the stability of the world.




It is clear as well, the Grani commentator says, that Putin wants to interfere in the American election not because he necessarily has concluded that one of the candidates is better for him than the other but because he wants Russia to be at the center of the election and he wants to spread chaos. Meanwhile, at home, he wants to tighten the screws.



But there are other questions where the answer is less clear, Milshteyn says. It is far from certain that Putin is “really prepared” to go to war against the US and NATO. He has bluffed before and then backed away concerning the Baltic countries, all of which are members of the Western alliance and have Article 5 guarantees.



“Nevertheless,” he continues, “to assert that there is nothing behind the blackmail except anger and hatred” is perhaps a mistake. The forces exist and a particular kind of habit and ability at making calculations about a multi-move geopolitical combination.” In short, the situation is extremely dangerous.





“In the person of Putin, the world for the first time in its history is encountering a real threat of destruction, and no one should underrate that threat – although it is not necessary to overrate it and fall into a panic.”


Instead, sober minds need to think carefully about how to counter the Kremlin leader rather than meeting his demands or leading him to go to war.






Andrey Piontkovsky



Piontkovsky agrees that Putin is engaging in blackmail and that this latest effort isn’t going to work. He says that this ultimatum is Putin’s very own version of “’the letter of the Kremlin Cossacks to the American sultan,’ an act of despair on the part of the head of the Kremlin.”



Putin’s blackmail, even raised to the level of nuclear weapons, isn’t going to work, Piontkovsky argues, because it hasn’t worked up to now. Indeed, the West has so changed its tone with Putin that his latest outburst may be read as little more than his angry response to the change in Western tone about him and his regime.


Information privacy in Russia is not privacy anymore

Under the new law, Russian Special services can read private messages of major apps' users
       

A big day comes for Russia. The authorities get ready to decode and read private messages of its citizens.

Local media say that Russian Special services now hire people who can hack the popular messenger services. Viber is the first in line. Then Facebook, Whatsapp, Telegram and Skype will follow.
 
Read also: Russian hi-tech spy devices under attack over privacy fears

Reading of personal messages is allowed by the new anti-terror law. It forces all mobile providers and social media to keep the data of their clients for at least half a year. The data must be given to police upon the first request. Eastern companies refused to open their data to Russian authorities and could now be fined. Meanwhile, Russia wants to get total access by all and any means.

[benoit77]

La menace de Poutine sur le plutonium est "tactiquement habile mais stratégiquement désastreuse», dit Solovey


il est probable que le fond u problème est que la Russie n'est plus en mesure d’exécuter sa part  par manque d'argent et de compétences.
Ce qui expliquerai pourquoi cette décision est prise seulement maintenant.

[Александр]

Il met tout sont argent dans l'armée, du coup il ne reste rien ou peu pour le reste . . .
Bien dans sa "logique" si tant est qu'il en a une.

[Александр]

En v'là une autre maintenant:

Russia tells citizens to ‘prepare for nuclear war with West’ 

Russia has warned citizens that a nuclear war with the West could be imminent - sparked by clashes in the Middle East.

Zvezda, a nationwide TV service run by the country’s Ministry of Defence, said last week, ‘Schizophrenics from America are sharpening nuclear weapons for Moscow.’

Officials said on Friday that underground shelters had been built which could house 12 milion people - enough for the entire population of Moscow.

Russia has clashed with the Western powers over its policy in Syria - where it’s accused of bombing civilians - and the U.S suspended negotiations with the country yesterday.





Both Russia and NATO are still in the position to unleash global-scale nuclear attacks - and the weapons are armed and ready.

The Arms Control Association says, ‘United States and Russia still deploy more than 1,500 strategic warheads on several hundred bombers and missiles - far more than necessary to deter nuclear attack - and they are modernizing their nuclear delivery systems.

[Александр]

Pour ceux qui sont abonné:

Angela Merkel dans le viseur du Kremlin



Manifestation du mouvement Pediga contre Angela Merkel, le 3 octobre à Dresde. Crédits photo : ODD ANDERSEN/AFP


L'objectif commun du Kremlin et de l'extrême droite allemande est de faire barrage à la réélection de la chancelière l'an prochain.

«Merkel en Sibérie, Poutine à Berlin»: le slogan est devenu un classique des manifestations populistes, encore scandé lundi dernier par les agitateurs venus perturber les célébrations de la fête nationale à Dresde. La capitale saxonne, ville-bastion de Pegida, hébergea le lieutenant-colonel du KGB Vladimir Poutine et sa famille à la fin des années 1980. Devenu le maître du Kremlin, il suscite la nostalgie dans les rangs de l'Alternative pour l'Allemagne (AfD) et des néonazis, qu'il invite à l'occasion dans «sa» ville de Saint-Pétersbourg. Avec Angela Merkel, les relations ont été cordiales jusqu'à ce que la chancelière se mette en travers de sa route en Ukraine. Au cours d'un appel téléphonique, la semaine dernière, la chancelière a une nouvelle fois pressé le président russe «d'œuvrer en faveur de la stabilisation du cessez-le-feu et la mise en place effective du traité de Minsk».

Le premier paragraphe donne le ton

[Александр]

Et encore des provocations:

NATO jets scrambled as Russian bombers fly south



Two Russian Blackjack bombers were intercepted by fighter jets from four European countries as they flew from the direction of Norway to northern Spain and back, it has emerged, according to the BBC.

Norway, the UK, France and Spain all scrambled jets as the TU-160 planes skirted the airspace of each country, the BBC wrote.

It comes at a time of heightened tension between the West and Russia.

Correspondents say the frequency of Russian bombers being intercepted by NATO planes has increased markedly.

Spanish media say it is the furthest south such an operation has had to take place.

The incident happened on September 22 but the full extent only came to light recently in a statement by the French ministry of defense (in French). It referred to it as an Air Policing [Baltic support] mission by the four countries involved.

It said Norway first detected the two Blackjack bombers to the north and scrambled two F-16 fighters to accompany them towards the north of Scotland.

The British RAF then sent Typhoon aircraft from RAF Lossiemouth to intercept the planes as they flew to the west of Shetland.

The RAF said at the time that at no point did the Russian jets enter UK air space.

British Typhoons were also launched from RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire as a precautionary measure, the RAF added, but did not intercept the bombers.

The Russian planes then skirted the west of Ireland and were picked up by two French Rafale fighter planes 100km off the coast of Brittany, the French ministry of defense said. Two other Rafale jets later took over to shadow the bombers as they flew south.

Finally, Spain sent two F-18 fighters to intercept the Russian planes north of Bilbao. The bombers then turned around and made a return journey. It is not believed that any further interceptions took place.

Iceland later complained to Russia that TU-160 Blackjack bombers had flown too close to civil airliners on the same day.

The foreign ministry said the planes had flown between 6,000-9,000ft (1,800-2,700m) below a plane flying from Reykjavik to Stockholm.

For the UK, it was the latest of several similar incidents involving Russian military aircraft.

In November 2015, Typhoon fighter jets were scrambled from Lossiemouth to intercept two Blackjack bombers.

RAF Typhoons from Lossiemouth were also scrambled in October 2015 to intercept two similar aircraft flying over the North Sea.

Russia`s relations with the West have declined since the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014.

They recently hit a new low when the U.S. broke off military co-operation with Moscow over Syria.

Après, ils sont tout étonné des réactions:

Estonia gets ready to confront military attacks


A support boat escorts a Portuguese submarine into the Baltic Sea as part of the multinational BALTOPS naval exercise on the Baltic Sea near Muuga, Estonia. June 5, 2016 (AP Photo)

Estonian government works on a concept of civil defence in case of a natural disaster or a military attack 
       

Estonia wants its people to get ready to possible external attacks or natural disasters. The government started to work on a new concept of civil defence. The group working on the document develops ways of quick alerting of people and creates training programs for civilians. For example, plans for a situation when electricity and communication systems are down.

Read more Russian war plane invades Estonian airspace

Recommendations will be released on what quantity of water, food and other basic goods every Estonian family should have in case of emergency. The plan also includes schools. Teachers already started civil defence trainings.

The concept will be ready by the end of the year. 

Red more Estonian foreign minister asks US to continue anti-Russian sanctions

Et:

Poland's territorial defence force, a response to Russia's aggressive imperialism - Defence Minister


Poland's Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz (AP photo)

A new bill on amending law on general military duty has already been sent to the parliament  
       

Poland's move to create the Territorial Defence Force, a 35,000 strong paramilitary unit, is a response to aggressive Russian imperialism, Polish Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz explained in an interview to the niezalezna.pl portal.

Read also Poland to increase military budget

The minister added that a bill on amending the country's law on universal military duty has already been sent to the Sejm. The draft law is intended to regulate the principles, organisational structure and methods of co-operation between the Territorial Defence Forces and other structures of the Polish Army.

Macierewicz stressed the security should be the country's top priority at the time when "Poland's neighbours are invaded by Russia"

"You have to face the truth and stop deceiving the Poles, because it may end up with drama and a national tragedy. Poland needs a strong army, a determination to defend the motherland and willingness to help our neighbours when they are attacked, and when their lands are invaded by Russian forces," said the defence minister.

Read also 'It's time to talk openly about Russia's aggression' - Polish Defence Minister

The idea of reviving Poland's territorial defence units gained momentum following Russia's annexation of Crimea and its invasion of eastern Ukraine.

[benoit77]

Russie : «Depuis l'assassinat d'Anna Politkovskaïa, la situation s'est empiré»

http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2016/10/07/01003-20161007ARTFIG00002-russie-depuis-l-assassinat-d-anna-politkovskaia-la-situation-s-est-empire.php

[Matt]

Quand la Russie décide pour la France:

Vladimir Poutine s'invite à Paris



Alors que le contentieux sur la Syrie divise les deux pays, le ministre des Affaires étrangères russe a paru forcer la main de son homologue français, jeudi, en annonçant la visite du président Poutine à Paris le 19 octobre.

Correspondant à Moscou
Avant même que Paris n'en fasse la déclaration, Moscou a officiellement et unilatéralement annoncé que Vladimir Poutine se rendrait à Paris le 19 octobre à l'occasion de l'inauguration du centre culturel russe, alors que la polémique enfle sur la Syrie. «Nous préparons une visite du président Poutine en France le 19 octobre», a déclaré le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Sergueï Lavrov, prenant manifestement de court son homologue français, Jean Marc Ayrault, qu'il recevait jeudi dans la capitale russe pour parler de la situation en Syrie. «Nos présidents auront une possibilité de s'entretenir sur la situation actuelle dans les relations bilatérales, ainsi que sur des questions internationales, y compris la Syrie et l'Ukraine», a précisé le chef de la diplomatie russe. Et d'ajouter: «Cette visite aura une grande importance.»

Prié par le Figaro de confirmer cette date, le ministre français a, au contraire, sèchement répondu: «Je ne suis pas venu ici pour parler des relations bilatérales, mais exclusivement de la situation à Alep.» Lors de son précédent déplacement à Moscou, en avril 2016, Jean-Marc Ayrault avait effectivement transmis à son homologue russe «une invitation du président Hollande à Vladimir Poutine pour une visite en octobre», mais sans préciser la date. Il était prévu depuis longtemps que chef du Kremlin participe à l'inauguration, à Paris, du «Centre spirituel et culturel orthodoxe russe», qui a vocation à abriter, en plus d'une cathédrale orthodoxe, une école bilingue, une maison paroissiale et les services culturels de l'ambassade. La date du 19 avait été avancée mais, ces derniers jours, dans un contexte de dégradation de la situation en Syrie, Paris laissait entendre que cette échéance pouvait être repoussée.

Une résolution française à l'ONU

Jeudi, Jean-Marc Ayrault a dénoncé une nouvelle fois l'attitude «cynique» de Moscou dans le conflit à Alep, visant notamment le ministre russe de la Défense, Sergueï Choïgou, qui avait vanté la «fiabilité» et «l'efficacité» des armes russes en Syrie. «J'ai rencontré Sergueï Lavrov pour lui redire les yeux dans les yeux que personne ne peut tolérer cette situation (à Alep, NDLR). La France ne peut pas le tolérer, la Russie ne peut pas le tolérer non plus», a ajouté le ministre, qui est venu à Moscou pour vendre un projet de résolution français visant, via l'ONU, à imposer un cessez-le-feu et l'accès à l'aide humanitaire à Alep.

Une visite dans dix jours de Vladimir Poutine à Paris, alors que le chef du Kremlin est très critiqué dans les principales chancelleries occidentales et en France, permettrait à Moscou de démentir tout isolement face à la communauté internationale. Jeudi, Sergueï Lavrov a rappelé que la Russie «attachait une importance particulière à la qualité des relations avec la France». À l'inverse, son homologue français n'a fait aucune allusion aux liens bilatéraux.

Du coup, une invitation aux français:

Place de la République, solidarité avec Alep. Soyons plus nombreux le 19 octobre lors de la venue de Poutine à Paris

[Janchik]

Anna Politkovskaya, dix ans déjà que tu nous as quitté lâchement assassinée alors que tu nous apportais la lumière. Le jour de l'anniversaire du Huïlo!

[Matt]

Il y a même en Russie une cérémonie pour cet anniversaire.
Son assasin y était (huilo). 

Il perd le sens des réalités, il veut rétablir les bases russe au Vietnam et à Cuba.
Vu le rapprochement de ces derniers avec les USA, je doute fort que ça se fasse.

У Кремлі підтвердили можливість повернення військових баз на Кубу та у В'єтнам

Le Kremlin a confirmé le retour des bases militaires à Cuba et au Vietnam

Il n'y a pas qu'à Paris qu'il y aura une visite russe controversée le 19:

Association Culturelle Romandie-Ukraine : appel au Conseil des Etats

Le 19 octobre 2016, le Président du Conseil des États a prévu de recevoir à Berne la présidente du Conseil de la Fédération de Russie, son homologue.

Cette rencontre ne devrait pas avoir lieu dans la mesure où, ces dernières années, les autorités de la Fédération de Russie ont été responsables des forfaits suivants :

•  annexion de la Crimée en violation du droit international ;
  
  
• fourniture du missile qui a abattu le vol MH17, causant la mort de 298 personnes;
  
  
• envoi de forces armées en Ukraine ;
  
  
• provocation d’actes de guerre dans l’est de ce pays, dont le bilan se monte à 10 000 morts et à 1,8 million de déplacés ;
  
  
• promulgation de lois portant atteinte aux libertés fondamentales ;
  
  
• incitation, directe ou indirecte, à l’assassinat de plusieurs journalistes et opposants politiques ;
  
  
• appui militaire au régime de Damas ;
  
  
• bombardements de convois humanitaires et d’hôpitaux en Syrie.
  
  

Pour ses actions criminelles, la Fédération de Russie a notamment :

• été condamnée par l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU suite à l’annexion de la Crimée ;
  
  
• été accusée devant le Conseil de Sécurité de barbarie et de crimes de guerre en Syrie ;
  
  
• fait l’objet de sanctions internationales, notamment de la part de l’Union Européenne, des Etats-Unis, du Canada et de l’Australie.
  
  

La Suisse a veillé jusqu’ ici à ce qu’elle ne puisse être utilisée pour contourner les sanctions internationales adoptées suite à l’annexion de la Crimée. Parmi les personnes sanctionnées et répertoriées par la Suisse figure Valentina Matviyenko, présidente de la Chambre haute du parlement russe et soutien sans faille de la politique de Vladimir Poutine. Pourtant, en dépit des sanctions qui la frappent, le Président du Conseil des États a l’intention de la recevoir, ce 19 octobre, à Berne.

Au prétexte que la situation en Ukraine se serait améliorée, cette visite semble aujourd’hui acceptable aux yeux de certains. Mais en réalité, dans l’Est de l’Ukraine, la situation est loin d’être apaisée ; les accords de Minsk ne sont pas respectés, et les armes lourdes tuent chaque semaine des soldats et des civils. De plus, la Russie se livre à une guerre totale en Syrie, anéantissant notamment la ville d’Alep, dont les habitants de tous âges meurent sous les bombes, y compris non conventionnelles. En 2014, le Conseil National avait annulé l’invitation faite au président de la Douma ; pourtant, depuis lors, la politique du Kremlin ne s’est pas infléchie dans le bon sens.

Si, dans de telles circonstances, le Président du Conseil des États recevait l’émissaire très officiel de la Fédération de Russie, il commettrait une faute politique. Nulle bonne raison ne peut légitimer aujourd’hui l’accueil de la représentante d’un État qui piétine les droits fondamentaux, viole les frontières d’un pays voisin et commet des crimes de guerre. Les vrais amis de la Russie ne sont pas ceux qui souhaitent cette visite ; la Suisse a plus et mieux à apporter à ce grand pays.

Le Conseil des États a l’occasion de délivrer un message fort, sauvegardant ainsi son honneur et celui de la Suisse : nous l’appelons pour cela à reporter cette visite.

Pour l’ACRU : Philippe Gafner

[Matt]

Il fallait bien l'évoquer en ce jour . . .

Dix ans après, le meurtre d'Anna Politkovskaïa toujours irrésolu

Sa chaise est restée là et le petit palmier dans son pot a continué de pousser. Dix ans après son assassinat à Moscou, le bureau d'Anna Politkovskaïa a été transformé par ses collègues journalistes en un petit autel "pour ne pas oublier".



© Image Globe / Peter Endig

Critique infatigable des exactions commises en Tchétchénie, Anna Politkovskaïa, journaliste pour le bi-hebdomadaire Novaïa Gazeta, a été tuée par balles le 7 octobre 2006 dans sa cage d'escalier, à 48 ans.
Son assassinat, commis le jour de l'anniversaire du président Vladimir Poutine, avait suscité l'émotion, notamment dans les pays occidentaux, où elle jouissait d'une notoriété plus forte qu'en Russie.

"A plusieurs reprises, nous lui avions demandé de ne plus s'occuper de la Tchétchénie, parce que c'était devenu trop dangereux", se souvient son ancien collègue, Sergueï Sokolov, devenu rédacteur en chef adjoint de Novaïa Gazeta. "Mais Anna disait qu'elle ne pouvait pas fermer les yeux sur ce que le pouvoir russe y faisait", dit-il à l'AFP.

Après deux jours de silence, Vladimir Poutine, cible récurrente des articles de la journaliste, avait promis une "enquête objective" sur son meurtre.

L'enquête, comme le procès, connaîtra de nombreux coups de théâtres: remaniement soudain de l'équipe d'enquêteurs, fuite en Sibérie du meurtrier présumé, acquittement de trois suspects puis annulation de cette décision par la Cour suprême russe...

"C'était très éprouvant", se souvient le fils d'Anna, Ilia Politkovski. "Et pour finir, il n'y a eu aucune sorte de justice".

- 'Justice n'a pas été faite' -

En juin 2014, à la suite de huit ans d'enquête, cinq hommes, dont quatre Tchétchènes, sont condamnés à de lourdes peines par un tribunal moscovite.

Roustam Makhmoudov, reconnu coupable d'avoir tiré sur la journaliste, et son oncle Lom-Ali Gaïtoukaïev, identifié comme l'organisateur du meurtre, écopent de la perpétuité.

Leurs complices reçoivent également de lourdes peines: 20 ans de prison pour le policier moscovite Sergueï Khadjikourbanov, 12 ans et 13 ans et demi pour les deux frères du tireur, Ibraguim et Djabraïl Makhmoudov.
Mais, malgré la sévérité des peines, le verdict est loin de satisfaire les proches d'Anna Politkovskaïa.

"Justice n'a pas été faite", martèle Sergueï Sokolov. "Oui, ceux qui l'ont tuée sont en prison mais pas leur patron, ni le patron de leur patron".

Pour Ilia Politkovski, "la justice s'est arrêtée en chemin". "Beaucoup d'hommes politiques disent que l'affaire est classée, mais c'est un mensonge, on en est loin, les organisateurs du meurtre n'ont pas été jugés".

Et la cellule d'enquêteurs mise en place par le Parquet pour l'identification des commanditaires semble piétiner: aucune avancée n'a été faite depuis deux ans.

"Toutes les pistes mènent à la Tchétchénie, aux plus hauts rangs de l'élite tchétchène, mais le pouvoir russe freine l'enquête", dénonce Pavel Kanyguine, journaliste à Novaïa Gazeta.

"Tant qu'il n'y aura pas de changement de régime politique en Russie, les commanditaires resteront en liberté", affirme-t-il à l'AFP.

- Des similarités avec le meurtre de Nemtsov -

L'assassinat par balles de l'opposant et ancien Premier ministre Boris Nemtsov, le 27 février 2015 à deux pas du Kremlin, a ravivé de douloureux souvenirs chez les proches d'Anna Politkovskaïa. "Nous avons vite remarqué de nombreuses similarités dans la façon dont le meurtre a été commis", explique Ilia Politkovski.

"On a tout de suite trouvé les gars qui l'avaient tué, on les a fait avouer sous les caméras des médias, on les a très vite arrêtés et la majorité d'entre eux sont Tchétchènes", précise-t-il. "Même le procès qui vient de commencer est très similaire".

Pour le fils de la journaliste, le meurtre de Boris Nemtsov impose un difficile constat: "Rien n'a changé".
Vendredi, pour commémorer les dix ans de l'assassinat d'Anna Politkovskaïa, Novaïa Gazeta a invité à se réunir auprès de la stèle à son effigie, dressée à l'entrée de la rédaction.

Malgré ses six journalistes ou collaborateurs tués depuis sa création en 1993, le bi-hebdomadaire n'a jamais cédé au découragement, affirme Sergueï Sokolov.

"Sauf une fois", admet-il. "C'était juste après le meurtre d'Anna, nous nous sommes réunis et nous avons décidé de fermer le journal. Car aucun journal ne mérite le sacrifice de vies humaines".

"Mais les plus jeunes de la rédaction s'y sont opposés. Et nous avons décidé de continuer, à une condition: retrouver les coupables des meurtres de nos journalistes", se souvient-il. "Tôt ou tard, nous y arriverons."

Pourtant tout le monde sait qui a fait le coup . . .

Voir les commentaires de deux trolls

[benoit77]

Ca se passe comme ça en Sainte Russie:

Combat de gamins en cadeau pour l'anniv de Kadirov:

Répugnant, la prochaine ça sera du cannibalisme ?

http://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/russie/le-president-tchetchene-defend-les-combats-mma-entre-enfants_1861013.html

[Matt]

Ils n'en ont pas fini avec les sanctions, il semble même que ce sera encore pire:

Syrian opposition wants EU sanctions against Russia


A civil defense member rescues a boy from wreckage after a barrel bomb attack staged by Syrian army in the opposition-controlled Mashhad district of Aleppo, Syria on July 25, 2016. (GettyImages Photo)


'At least 400 killed since start of Assad and Russia's bombardment campaing', an opposition figure said

The opposition in Syria, High Negotiations Committee (HNC) urges the European Union to impose sanctions on Russia in response to Moscow's activities in the war-torn country.


This is reported by Turkish state-run news agency Anadolu. 


Read also: Kerry says Putin-Assad deeds should be investigated as war crimes

The HNC member, Bassma Kodmani has called on the EU to 'consider every option' to protect the people in Syria. 


'Advanced Russian weaponry, including 'Bunker Buster' bombs used against civilian and medical infrastructure are causing unprecedented destruction and civilian casualties, particularly in Eastern Aleppo. At least 400 civilians have been killed there since the start of the regime's and Russia's indiscriminate bombardment campaign', Kodmani said in a statement. 


He said that the EU must introduce sanctions against Russian officials and companies for 'targeting civilians and medical infrastructure', as well as those that finance 'the Assad regime'.
 
Read also: 'Unquestionably a war crime' – Boris Johnson on Putin's deeds

'The EU successfully sanctioned Russia over its role in Ukraine. It is also in Europe's interest to pursue all options to end the catastrophe in Syria and its global consequences: the refugee crisis and terror threat', the opposition figure said. 


Russia has been conducting air strikes in Syria, saying its bombers are only targeting radical terrorist groups of the Islamic State. 
The West, in turn, has said Russia is supporting Assad's dictatorship.
Et:
EU ready to consider sanctions against Russian MPs ”elected” in occupied Crimea

The European Union is ready to consider the imposition of sanctions against the so-called deputies of the State Duma, which had been ”elected” in the Russian-annexed Crimea, that`s according to Deputy Minister of Justice of Ukraine Serhiy Petukhov and First Deputy Minister of Information Policy Emine Dzhaparova who spoke after the completion of bilateral consultations with the EU in Brussels Friday, an UNIAN correspondent reports.

”They are ready to consider to add to a personalized [sanctions] list those who have been elected to the State Duma, because these people, besides being ”elected” had been directly involved in the developments in Crimea. The sanctions, which will ban them from traveling to the EU will be an appropriate response to eliminate the possibility of any official visits of these people as the representatives of the Russian Federation at any level,” Petukhov said.

Dzhaparova clarified that it is about seven ”deputies”, and sanctions have already been applied against two of them – Mikhail Sheremeta and Natalia Poklonskaya.

”Our main focus was that Russia would try to use them as agents of influence. We understand that they will take them to various international institutions, to conferences, in order to present them as a kind of a ”Voice of Crimea” and to show their own ”vision” of Crimea. That is why we ask that you consider that, in our opinion, these people should also be put on the list of persons who will be denied entry to the EU,” said Dzhaparova.

As UNIAN reported earlier, the MEPs had sent a letter to EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini demanding to impose sanctions against the Duma deputies illegally ”elected” in the Russian-occupied Crimea.

[Matt]

Ils peuvent reconnaître leurs conne . . . ries:

Russian Police Return Confiscated Nemtsov Protest Banner After Realizing It's a Putin Quote 


C'est pour celui de gauche que je poste la photo.   Kremlin Press Service

Police have returned a banner condemning the murder of Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov after realizing that it featured a quote from President Vladimir Putin.


Gera Knyazev, from the Russian city of Nizhniy Novgorod, claimed that local police confiscated the banner last March when he had hung it from the balcony of his office.

Writing on Facebook, Knyazev said that officers had seized the banner for “signs of extremism.”

The quote had in fact been spoken by President Vladimir Putin. “Russia must at last be rid of the shame and tragedy such as that which we lived through and saw not long ago,” Putin said after the politician's murder. “I mean the audacious murder of Boris Nemtsov right in the center of the capital.”

The banner was returned by the police on Oct. 7, 2016: Putin's birthday.

“It's Kafka-esque: the police returned the banner today, on the birthday of the 'extremist' himself,” Knyazev wrote. “I just had to hang it in the same spot.”

В марте прошлого года я повесил этот баннер на балконе своего офиса. В тот же день нижегородская полиция его демонтировала для проверки на экстремизм слов, сказанных человеком имеющим непосредственное отношение к этому преступлению. И словно по сценарию Кафки, именно сегодня, в день рождение " экстремиста" , баннер полиция вернула не найдя крамолы. По-этому же сценарию мне остаётся только повесить его на место, что я и сделал. 
В память о достойном человеке у которого 9 октября день рождения




Boris Nemtsov was fatally shot in the back in a drive-by shooting while walking across Moscow's Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge, close to Red Square, on Feb. 27, 2015.

Five men are currently charged with carrying out his murder: Zaur Dadaev, brothers Anzor and Shagid Gubashev, Tamerlan Eskerkhanov, and Khamzat Bakhaev. A sixth suspect, Beslan Shavanov, killed himself during a confrontation with police.

Russian troll farms behind campaign to topple Ukraine’s goverment


Image: texty.org.ua, edited by Euromaidan Press 

Over 2,000 social media profiles, directed from Moscow, were orchestrating a “third Maidan” campaign in Ukrainian social media. The internet portal Texty.org.uainvestigated the origins of the social media frenzy urging to topple the government over 8 months and uncovered a network of trolls coordinated by a former “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DNR”) militant now leading special operations in Moscow.


“Stepan Mazura” and his “Third Maidan”


It was in February 2016 when Sergei Zhuk, a “DNR” militant posing under the nickname “Stepan Mazura,” was brought to light in an investigation by UKRINFORM. Under the guise of a Ukrainian patriot, this native of Donbas better known by his nom de guerre Moskva in the circles of the militants of the Russian-backed “DNR,” was managing several facebook and Vkontakte groups in order to heat up Ukrainian society with an evil fire. The ultimate goal was to stage a “Third Maidan” that would bring people out into the streets, in order to bring to power a new “proper government” which would never again allow another Maidan to take place.

Sergei Zhuk with DNR “Deputy Defense Minister” E. А. Basurin

Authentic critical articles from Ukrainian sources were interspersed with fake reports. There were manipulative surveys on the theme of “removing [Ukrainian President] Poroshenko” with predictions by fake experts on the forthcoming total failure or even collapse of Ukraine. All the materials fit into either of two topics: “Bad Ukrainian government” and “all to Maidan,” and were concocted to appeal to patriots disappointed with Ukrainian politicians, urging them towards an armed rebellion. But the sheer quantity of material was impossible for one person to write. Moreover, the so-called Ukrainian patriot’s IP was based in Moscow. Finally, Zhuk’s friends filled in the gaps: “Stepan Mazura” had moved up the career ladder to Moscow in 2015, leading a special operation against Ukraine.


After Mazura and his virtual “Third Maidan” were uncovered, his social media accounts were deleted. However, a certain “Mykola Haiduk” suddenly took over the admin functions of the groups that Stepan Mazura once directed, continuing the fight for toppling the Ukrainian government with the help of an army of trolls. What follows is an abridged and adapted translation of Texty‘s investigation.


The “Third Maidan” – an idea born right out of the second one

The concept of the “Third Maidan” isn’t new. Voting falsifications which brought a fraudulent presidential victory to Viktor Yanukovych in 2004 brought people out to the first Maidan, known as the Orange revolution. The second Maidan, Euromaidan protests, removed the same Yanukovych from power in 2014. Right after it, political analysts started warning that, apart from a military invasion of Ukraine’s eastern regions, Russian president Vladimir Putin will be aiming to incite a revolt against the new government elected in Ukraine after the Euromaidan revolution.

What better way to carry this out than creating a false-flag organization which your enemies would enter. In 1921-1926, the State Political Directorate of the Soviet Union ran “Operation Trust,” a counterintelligence operation during which a fake anti-Bolshevist resistance organization “Monarchist Union of Central Russia” kept all the enemies of the regime under close surveillance and ultimately neutralized them.
These activities are being employed also today. According to the data of the Ukrainian special services, around 300 specialists in Moscow are tasked with recruiting and managing agents in Ukraine. But working on the internet is much easier – one can hide behind the anonymity of an internet profile.

“An element in the Soviet (and now Russian) toolkit is “active measures”—direct intervention by clandestine means in the politics of another country. Active measures may entail the following:
[list="c15 lst-kix_list_1-0 start"]
[*]Influencing the policies of another government;
[*]Undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions;
[*]Disrupting its relations with other nations;
[*]Discrediting and weakening governmental and nongovernmental opponents,”
[/list]

Edward Lucas and Peter Pomerantsev explain in the report “Winning the Information war.”

In the “Third Maidan” social media groups, Russian political technologists regularly promoted the idea of an armed uprising against the current government to Ukrainians who cared the most about the situation in the country.


How does this work?

Texty journalists analyzed 29 social media groups, whose administrators or active users are connected to “Stepan Mazura” or the communities he managed. Professional trolls stand behind a part of these accounts, and a part are regular people who became facebook friends with trolls from the group. The result is a network of 2,000 social network users.

“There can be many networks like this,” Texty editor-in-chief Roman Kulchytskyitold RFERL. “Anybody with enough resources can hire the relevant specialists, can create a network of bots. We uncovered one of the Russian networks, but there can be many of them.”

#Betrayal (#Zrada). Image: texty.org.ua

A troll, or account of a live person or a robot that is used for political propaganda, creates automatic friend requests. With each new “friend,” the troll grows in size. Its social network “weight” increases if it befriends a popular blogger.

A troll program can exchange sweet nothings or likes with a similar program. These acts also increase their “weight.” But when the time comes, when some topic needs to be fueled, the troll accounts start to be managed by a real person.

Also, real people, often acting under pseudonyms, moderate groups with large concentrations of trolls. These were also included in the “troll network.”

When the time comes and the managers of this troll farm want to promote some message, one of the trolls make a post. A huge amount of others start liking, commenting, and sharing it. The facebook algorithm identifies this as real people being interested in the post, and it surfaces in the facebook feeds of NOT-trolls who once accepted the troll’s friend request.

If the post is successful, regular people start sharing it, and eventually the journalists catch up. If a person has too many friends spreading troll content, which focuses on emotions and conspiracy theories, then the impression is made that the only way to escape the seemingly hopeless situation is to resort to violence. The troll accounts bluntly suggest ousting Ukraine’s current President Poroshenko, like the previous one.


The style of Russian trolls in Ukraine

There were trolls who specialized on posts (the most active ones made 300-600 posts over two months), changed their names often, but were possible to trace because of the immutable facebook ID assigned to each user.

Another category of trolls left prolific comments under the posts – up to 720 per two months. Often, the comments were copy-pasted to save efforts. Here is an example of one by “Dmytro Zvolinskyi” that was spread 130 times, featuring names of Ukrainian oligarchs and politicians, among them the current President Poroshenko:

“Dmytro Zvolinsky”‘s avatar

“Dictator Medvedchuk.KuchmaAkhmetovPinchuk”: “DICTATORSHIP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.” Each traitor WILL ANSWER for his crimes. Kuchma, Medvedchuk, Pinchuk, Akhmetov, Yushchenko, Yanukovych, POROSHENKO are INTERNATIONAL criminals who DESTROY Ukrainians. Such a pity that there are little free people – most are SLAVES.”


He actively promotes “10 steps on the way to dignity,” the main goal of which is to gather people on Maidan without politicians, impeach the President and demand unspecified “changes.” Hysterical appeals to castrate “the criminal GROUP ‘Presidential Administration'” and “Poroshenko and Putin Bloc” have little to do with reason. But after all, we’re living in a post-factual world where it’s most important to achieve an emotional resonance with your target audience.


Archetypes of the “Galaxy of trolls”

The typical troll falls into one of four main types, which in the opinion of Texty are universal images firmly embedded into national memory, the ones Carl Jung called archetypes.


1. The revolutionary radical, a propagandist of violence, national revolution against the internal occupation and harbinger of death to Yatsenyuk, Groysman, Putin, Poroshenko, Jews, gays, government officials etc. His leitmotif: “We’ll destroy the government, kill all the bad guys, and then finally live the good life. These militant trolls often display sympathies for ultra-right political movements and imitate the cult of Stepan Bandera.

2. The political commentator, who focuses more on the current political events than appeals to a revolution. This trolls specializes on derogatory images of politicians or officials. The general tone of their messages is nearly identical to the revolutionary radical, but there’s more political dirt.


3. Ukrainians on display. Pensive girls in traditional flower crowns, dresses in the color of the Ukrainian flag. This image carries an element of suffering straight out of Shevchenko’s novels. However, the content doesn’t differ much: the same hyperlinks to questionable sites, discreditation of the authorities, examples of injustice, and solid proof that all is lost.

4. Carnivores. Not cats! This is a rare type of trolls: they have many friends and connections in the network, often are group administrators, but they seldom make posts.
Links leading to questionable sites
Most of the trolls’ posts are hyperlinks, not original materials. They lead to sites of questionable quality which intersperse real news with manipulations and fakes.


Who is a real user? Who is a troll?

Texty provided some indicators pointing to a high likelihood of troll-ness:
[list="font-family: 'Roboto Slab'; line-height: 28.8px; border: 0px; border-image-source: initial; border-image-slice: initial; border-image-width: initial; border-image-outset: initial; border-image-repeat: initial; margin: 5px 0px 15px 17px; padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; list-style: none; background-color: rgb(252, 252, 252);"]
[*]No photos or information about the person, the page has little personal posts, mostly – reposts about “enemies,” “traitors,” or “white noise” posts – about methods to lose weight or tie a tie, all without personal comments and impressions. Often, a troll is 80% program which can post such meaningless content. Sometimes the troll is tagged in a photo with a real person.
[*]Either too little or too many friends (either the same trolls as themselves or popular users, including Ukrainian politicians).
[/list]

Real people ended up in Texty‘s investigation – because they became friends with a troll, were added to a group, or because they believed in the troll’s activities. In this case, the manipulations of the Kremlin brought fruit.


“Sowing mistrust ” – a classic strategy

The propaganda that the Kremlin produces for Russians doesn’t really work in influencing the majority of Ukrainians: they don’t believe in tales about the world planning an attack against Russia, and clearly see Russian aggression against Ukraine.

But we should remember that war propaganda has different audiences. Its goal is to boost the morale of your own team and demoralize your opponent.  In the Ukrainian case, this means discrediting the authorities and state institutions. After all, why should ordinary Ukrainians “go fight for the oligarchs?”

“Sowing mistrust between the elite and masses” is one of the methods of winning over an enemy state known from times of ancient China.
Ukrainian patriots and volunteers, or more specifically, their virtual dummies, are ideal vehicles for spreading sentiments of “betrayal” and calling for a new revolution. For the Kremlin, it makes no difference that the “revolutionaries” vilify Putin and Russia on their facebook profiles – after all, it’s the result that matters, Texty stresses.

Read more: ZRADA: the Ukrainian talent of feeling betrayed whenever, wherever

The content of the facebook groups and profiles that Texty uncovered are filled with hatred and contempt for Ukrainian authorities and politicians. Parallels are made between Putin and Poroshenko-Yatsenyuk-Groysman. The name of the Ukrainian President or Prime Minister doesn’t matter – even when they change, they won’t stop getting battered by the trolls, and the arguments will remain identical.

Pseudopatriotic trolls are much more dangerous than vulgar missionaries of the Russian world, Texty warns. Ukraine has a drastically low level of trust in public institutions and law enforcement structures – volunteers, the Church, and the Army istrusted the most. This is used by the enemy.


The solution?

Texty warns: don’t give into emotions. Don’t share hysterical posts, don’t become friends with trolls. To improve the quality of governance in Ukraine, one should look for the reasons of problems, change each given situation, provide grounded criticism, but not discredit even further. If there is no trust in state authorities, there is no fundamental order, and chaos erupts.

Plus inquiétant cette fois:

Russia moving nuclear-capable missiles into Kaliningrad: U.S. intelligence official

Russia is moving nuclear-capable missiles into Kaliningrad, a tiny Russian enclave sitting between Poland and Lithuania, a U.S. intelligence official said Friday, confirming Estonian news reports, according to Reuters. 


kbm.ru 

Russia's reasons for shipping the 500-kilometer-range Iskander-M missiles to Kaliningrad "could be innocuous," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, as reported by Reuters. 

"They moved a similar missile system to Kaliningrad in 2014 for a military exercise. It could also be a political gesture - a show of strength - to express displeasure with NATO," said the official.

[benoit77]

iskander :
c'est plus une présomption c'est confirmé par les russes :
http://www.interfax.ru/russia/531652

Soit disant afin de formation !
bien sur comme les petits hommes verts en Crimée c'était juste un exercice d'entrainement

Toujours dit que la Russie a déjà commencé sa guerre contre l’Europe.

[Matt]

Des missiles à Kaliningrad, ça menace directement toute l'Europe de l'Ouest:


Il s'agit de "quelques" centaines de kilomètres . . .

[benoit77]

Oui et c'est pas des armes justes "défensives" !

[Matt]

Bah, ils vont dire que c'est pour se défendre des hordes nazies venue d'Europe . . .

[Krispoluk]

Tant mieux pour eux...

Ils s'enfoncent dans leur stupidité : " Montrer sa force pour être respecté..."  

Pendant ce temps, la Suède et la Finlande s'interrogent pour savoir s'ils ne vont pas rejoindre l'Otan, tandis que la Pologne et les pays Baltes augmentent leurs dépenses militaires et demandent une protection accrue de l'Otan...

Totalement contre-productif politiquement et diplomatiquement !  

Laissons-les s'enfoncer dans leur connerie...

[Thuramir]

Tant mieux pour eux...

Ils s'enfoncent dans leur stupidité : " Montrer sa force pour être respecté..."  

Pendant ce temps, la Suède et la Finlande s'interrogent pour savoir s'ils ne vont pas rejoindre l'Otan, tandis que la Pologne et les pays Baltes augmentent leurs dépenses militaires et demandent une protection accrue de l'Otan...

Totalement contre-productif politiquement et diplomatiquement !  

Laissons-les s'enfoncer dans leur connerie...

Ce déploiement de forces militaires et d'armes nucléaires paraît en effet avoir des effets contre-productifs indiscutables dans les Etats limitrophes et au-delà. Politique coûteuse et inutile pour tout le monde (sauf les industries d'armement et ceux qui en émargent financièrement) ! 

Ce n'est certainement pas de la sorte qu'un climat de confiance réciproque sera atteint. La crainte n'a jamais été bonne conseillère. 

[Matt]

D'autant que:






Ambassador @YelchenkoUN on #Russia'n destructive role in #Syria



Statistics: If Putin at 64 were the ordinary Russian he likes to say he is

[Matt]

Un peu de (longue) lecture:

Understanding Russia’s Concept for Total War in Europe

By Martin N Murphy, PhD
Russia perceives itself as surrounded by enemies, and that the strategic depth that has been its principal security must be restored. In this sense, no territory is more significant than Ukraine. Russian leadership also worries about the erosion of a zone around Russia’s borders where politically dangerous ideas can be stifled before they undermine the regime’s hold on power.
Russia’s leadership believes it can stem this erosion and achieve its objectives by combining organized military violence with economic, political, and diplomatic activity, a combination called new generation warfare (NGW). NGW is a concept for fighting total war in Europe, across all fronts—political, economic, informational, cyber—simultaneously through fear and intimidation without launching a large-scale attack. If fighting is required, it is highly networked and multi-directional. The stakes can be raised rapidly, possibly without limit.
President Vladimir Putin is confident in this approach because he sees U.S. hesitation as opportunity and believes the U.S. is overly dependent on military responses. Thus, NGW is designed to avoid giving the U.S. and other adversaries a reason to respond using military force. The U.S. needs to broaden its response portfolio to include political, diplomatic, economic, financial, cyber, covert, and other means coordinated into a comprehensive approach to counter the NGW strategy. Russia has brought total war back to Europe—in a hidden, undeclared, and ambiguous form. Failure to confront Russian opportunism will validate Putin’s approach.
In the night of February 26 to 27, 2014, small groups of armed men, who later acquired the labels “little green men,” and even “polite green men” (which were anything but), appeared across Crimea.[1] They corralled Ukrainian forces in their bases, making it plain that any attempt to leave would be met with violence; they took over communications masts and studios, ensuring that the only messages accessible to the Crimean population were those they sent out; they took over government offices, ensuring that no decisions other than those they approved could be made; and eventually, at the point of a gun, ensured that the Crimean assembly voted to approve a plebiscite, which would eventually return a near-Soviet-era approval rating of 93 percent for the (re)-unification of Crimea with Mother Russia. Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, later admitted the denials made at the time about Russian involvement were untrue, and that the entire operation had been planned and conducted by Russia’s armed forces. Shorn of its disguise it was a Russian invasion and occupation pure and simple.
Crimea is a peninsula extension of Ukraine that, while incorporated into Russia in Tsarist times, had been part of Ukraine since 1954.[2] It remained so when the Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine emerged as an independent state. The transfer was reaffirmed in a further treaty in 2003.[3] Russia’s invasion was an act of war in contravention of the United Nations Charter and international law. Moreover, when Russia subsequently absorbed Crimea, it was the first forced transfer of territory in Europe since 1945. Russia’s claims that it has acted legally in response to appeals by the ousted Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych, and the region’s majority Russian-speaking population, were manifestly bogus.[4]
This illegal act, and the subsequent Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, has sparked shamefully little international outrage. The belief appears widespread that, while the West seeks a negotiated settlement to the eastern Ukraine invasion, it will acquiesce to the seizure of Crimea. The principal Western response has been economic: the imposition of a very limited range of sanctions on Russian individuals and corporations which, although they have inflicted quite possibly greater economic pain than is realized or yet apparent, has not made Russia’s leadership re-think its aggression or restore the status quo ante.[5] No attempt has been made to supply Ukraine with the arms it needs to expel the Russian-backed forces from its territory. This reluctant response, not least by the Obama Administration, makes a broad-based understanding of what appears to be a new Russian politico-military doctrine essential. The same goes for the steps the United States and its allies need to take to counter it successfully in the future.

How Russia Views the West

Russia perceives itself as a country surrounded by enemies. This has been a persistent theme throughout its history. It was an important driver of its westward territorial expansion into Central Europe, south across the Black Sea and into the Caucasus, and east all the way to the Pacific, in search of strategic depth. It began under the tsars, took a pause during the early days in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, but continued in 1945 under the rule of Stalin. With the fall of the Soviet Union, significant portions of that depth were lost, most significantly in Europe.
Russians also ascribe cultural and military significance to territory; it is difficult for outsiders to understand how important it is to Russians’ sense of national identity. In this sense, no territory is more significant than Ukraine, in which is located much of the original Russian heartland known as the Rus, and Crimea which, when transferred to Ukraine by Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, occasioned considerable resentment even at the time. Equally, it seems that many Russians are unable to appreciate how seminal personal and political freedom, democracy, and the rule of law are to the self-identity of people living in Western Europe and North America, and to the peoples of Central Europe that retain a clear recollection of Soviet oppression.
The sense of encirclement featured prominently in the 2003 Russian Defense White Paper, which essentially dismissed the concept of a “common European home” that had been proposed by the last Soviet premier, Mikhail Gorbachev, along with its commitment to non-aggression.[6] Suspicion of Western good faith, and the belief that NATO and the European Union had abrogated agreements arrived at following the fall of the Berlin Wall, compounded Russia’s belief in its own isolation and vulnerability. In particular NATO was accused of expanding into former Warsaw Pact states in defiance of understandings. Yet in 1993, Russia’s first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin, in speeches in both Warsaw and Prague, conceded that Russia could not stand in the way if former Warsaw Pact states wished to join NATO or the European Union, and that such moves did not compromise Russian interests. Although Russian officials quickly repudiated their leader’s public statements, the U.S. and NATO’s European members made it clear that in the light of Yeltsin’s admission they would welcome the accession of Central European states.
The crucial point, however, was that it was the facts on the ground that counted. NATO enlarged because it could. Russia, now no longer the Soviet Union, was weak. Because Russian weakness continued, Western European governments subsequently felt able to shrink their own defense establishments radically, while successive U.S. Administrations felt free to withdraw forces back to bases in America. Even as Vladimir Putin’s antagonistic rhetoric and Russian investment in its military capability increased, fed by high energy prices, neither was met with a commensurate response from the West. The upshot is that NATO is relatively weaker militarily, and less cohesive politically, than it was. Russia is aggressive now because it can be.
Putin stated that Crimea was annexed to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO.[7] While there was a remote possibility that Ukraine may have been admitted to the EU, its chances of joining NATO in the near future and sheltering under Article 5 collective defense guarantees were close to zero. Putin’s statement was political: The message to his domestic audience was that Russia was strong again and would remain so under his leadership; to NATO and Western leaders it was a signal that Russia had the means and the will not just to stop NATO coming to Ukraine’s aid (as it had done to a limited extent with Georgia in 2008) but to take back what had been taken from it during its own period of weakness.
This defiance, however, is not born of strength, but of the recognition that, while the gap has narrowed considerably, its inferiority to the West continues. Russia believes it is under attack. It believes that the strategic depth, which has always been its principal security, must be restored, and for that to happen it needs to gain the strategic initiative. The narrative that the West has defaulted on, or even broken, post–Cold War agreements is useful as a justification for aggressive diplomacy and covert measures even though it takes no account of Western Europe’s de-militarization and the fact NATO made no attempt to advance its front line hundreds of miles eastward. In 1994, Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov even stated that he had “become convinced NATO is not a threat to Russia, but I have millions to convince in Russia who are still worried that it is a threat.”[8]
Under Putin, no effort was made to correct this impression, arguably because no substantial authoritarian state has survived without external enemies. Consequently, it now demands, in effect, that the West acquiesce in suppressing (or at best refusing to support) Ukrainian democracy, personal and press freedom, rule of law, and economic ties to European and world markets. It wants the countries in what it refers to as its “near abroad” to remain locked into its sphere of influence without any prospect of release.[9] While Putin talks about the need for a military buffer zone between Russia and the West, what worries him and his lieutenants more is the erosion of a political dead zone around Russia’s borders where politically dangerous ideas can be stifled before they infect the homeland and undermine his position. A Ukraine—or even Belarus—that escaped Russian control sufficiently to hold free and fair elections, defeat corruption, guarantee judicial independence, and succeed in building a diversified market economy free of state-run enterprises would stand as a powerful rebuke to the faux democratic, corrupt, and energy-dependent home of oligarchic-capitalism that is Russia today. Unfortunately, too many Western countries are prepared to appease Russia—at least to a point—in hopes of a quiet life. Under President Obama, the United States appears to be one of them.

Russia’s Tactics, Ability, and Hostility

Russia’s tactics, its ability to carry them out, and its hostility toward the West have come as a shock to Western observers. In each case this shock is misplaced. Each is underpinned by a coherent strategy, but the policy that drives the strategy is mired in a sour mixture of anti-Western resentment, conspiracy theories, clericism, and nationalism.
Crucially, Russia has clearly thought about how it can use asymmetric means to offset its own weakness. In part this has meant drawing upon its Soviet past. What has occurred in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has its roots in Leninist theory and early Bolshevik military experience. Lenin built on Clausewitz when he subordinated all military activity to political purpose and drew no distinction between military and civilian domains, but left his own mark on military theory when he emphasized the role of propaganda and taught that terrorism was a legitimate tool of war. In 1924, Estonia was attacked in a manner similar to the 2014 invasion of Crimea: The attacking force consisted of unmarked Soviet troops and local agents—backed by the threat of an invasion by Soviet regular forces—which took over strategic locations, government buildings, and communications facilities in what turned out to be a failed attempt to overthrow the Estonian government.[10] Later, in 1939, a large Soviet force invaded Finland in what became known as the Winter War. As soon as the Soviets crossed the border, they set up a puppet government, like the “little green men” did in Crimea.[11]
During the Cold War the Soviet Army reportedly laid elaborate plans to infiltrate Western Europe with small groups drawn from the Main Intelligence Agency (GRU) and the Spetznaz, its special operations forces (SOF), to carry out intelligence, surveillance, sabotage, terror, and assassination missions. These groups would have worn civilian clothing, arrived in the target countries using civilian transport, and once there would have teamed up with Soviet spy networks, sleeper agents, and sympathetic locals before drawing their weapons and explosives from pre-positioned stashes.[12] Finally, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was led by 700 Spetznaz troops wearing Afghan uniforms.[13]
Yet military thought does not stand still and Russian military thought, both pre-Soviet and post-Soviet, has, like Soviet military thought, a long history of sound analysis and effective innovation. U.S. military thinking over the past 20 years, for example, has been shaped in many ways by the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, which has its origins in the Soviet concept of a “military-technical revolution” that evolved in the 1980s.[14] More recently, Russian thinkers have married previous Soviet thinking about asymmetric warfare to lessons drawn from modern warfare involving the West and their own experience in Chechnya.
The chief of staff of the Russian Federation, General Valery Gerasimov, writing in the journal Voenno-promishlenniy kurier in 2013 argued, with reference to the events of the “Arab Spring,” that the rules of warfare had changed, making open warfare both harder to realize and in many cases unnecessary.[15] The objectives that had previously been viewed as attainable by direct military action alone could now be achieved by combining organized military violence with a greater emphasis on economic, political, and diplomatic activity, a combination he called new generation warfare (NGW), and which observers in the West have labelled the Gerasimov Doctrine.[16]
In Gerasimov’s view, non-military methods could be superior to direct military action in reaching political and strategic goals, and this needed to be reflected in a new and diversified order of battle. He makes the point that in recent conflicts non-military measures occurred at a rate of four to one over military operations.[17] Consequently, when laying out his argument, Gerasimov emphasized the importance of controlling the information space and the real-time coordination of all aspects of a campaign, in addition to the use of targeted strikes deep in enemy territory and the destruction of critical civilian as well as military infrastructure. The ground force element, he continued, which should be concealed as long as possible, needed to consist of paramilitary and civilian insurgents backed by large numbers of SOF and supported by robotic weapons, such as drones. Regular units “should be put into action only in the late phases of the conflict, often under the disguise of peacekeeper or crisis-management forces.”[18]
New generation warfare is a live topic among Russian strategic thinkers. Russian presidential adviser Vladislav Surkov has written about “non-linear” war, describing it as one that involves everybody and everything while remaining elusive in its main contours.[19] Two other writers, Sergei Chekinov and Sergei Bogdanov, elaborated Gerasimov’s thesis. They argued that the Gulf War was the first NGW conflict in history and illustrated the importance of neutralizing the enemy’s military superiority through the combined use of political, economic, technological, ecological, and information campaigns, and optimizing the effectiveness of all these tools by integrating them into a single, shared system of command and control.[20]
Chekinov and Bogdanov shared Gerasimov’s concern that the U.S. could orchestrate a NGW campaign against Russia. Consequently they argued that Russia had to develop the capacity and capability to deploy non-military methods on a large scale before—and during—any armed confrontation. They listed media, religious and cultural organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and pro-democracy movements in Russia that benefited from foreign funding, and scholars in receipt of foreign grants, as possible components in a coordinated attack; and accused the U.S. of organizing an army of Internet “trolls” and of using Twitter and Facebook for information warfare purposes.[21] This goes some way to explain the 2012 closure of the U.S. Agency for International Development office in Moscow and the more recent crackdown on foreign donor organizations and their recipients.[22]
Finally, the authors emphasized the combat importance of electronic warfare. In their view NGW would be dominated increasingly by psychological and information warfare aimed at crushing the morale of enemy troops and the population, thus breaking their will to resist.[23]

New Generation Warfare in Action

András Rácz, summing up Chekinov and Bogdanov’s thesis, writes that there is a “striking similarity between the new generation war theoretically described by [them] in 2013 and the events that took place in Ukraine in 2014, particularly prior to and during the Russian operation in Crimea.”[24] The salient features of NGW as they describe it, and the facts on the ground in Crimea and later in Eastern Ukraine, are important, but must be viewed as part of an evolving concept not an example of settled doctrine.
Phase One: Weakening the Target and Preparing the Battlespace. Aggressive war is about the exploitation of weakness for political purposes. It is distinguished from other political acts through its extensive—in the classical sense, predominant—use of organized violence. In NGW, organized violence is an ever-present threat, wielded mainly by organized civilian demonstrators, agitators, and SOF but only in the later stages—if necessary—by conventional forces:

• During Phase One of a NGW campaign, Russia would deploy all arms of Russian power to identify political, economic, and military vulnerabilities, and weaknesses in government administration and the police.
  
  
• In the information domain, Russia would seek to establish or buy media assets it could control (such as the RT network, which has built an increasing presence across Europe and North America headlined by Russia Today); establish or suborn NGOs to support Russian policies directly or indirectly; and establish diplomatic and media narratives that, when the time comes, can be used to justify and defend the actions of those who oppose the target government on the one hand, and on the other to cheerlead Russian support for opposition or secessionist interests. These actions are very similar to the agitprop tactics and influence operations deployed during the Soviet era. They have been upgraded significantly in terms of sophistication and reach for superficial similarity with Western news organizations.[25] These Russian outlets do not, however, harbor any doubts about which side they are on.
  
  
• Beyond the information war, Russia would use political, diplomatic, media, and covert means to encourage dissatisfaction with central authority; encourage local separatist movements; inflame ethnic, religious, and social divisions; recruit politicians, officials, and members of the target country’s military; make common cause with organized crime groups; and, by establishing close economic ties with the target country or specific companies, make it dependent on Russian markets or supplies, thus creating a vested interest in maintaining good relations even in the face of Russian military or political provocations. When the time for action arrives, the established networks will be activated, or the level of their activities stepped up, while Russian regular forces will be massed on the border under the pretext of military exercises.
  
  

Countering these moves is difficult because almost nothing illegal has occurred, no violent incidents have taken place, dislocations of food and energy supplies can be presented as commercial disagreements, and much of what is circulated in the media can be regarded as legitimate comment. If the target government overreacts, that can play to Russia’s advantage, enabling it to protest its innocence, establish a narrative of non-intervention, and even condemn the government’s actions if they prejudice the rights and interests of Russian minorities. As Rácz comments, sowing “self-doubt and fear constitute important parts” of Moscow’s subversive ambition.[26]
Phase Two: Attack. During this phase, Russia would exploit the tensions it has created to bring down the legitimate government and establish its own substitute regime.

• The first moves would be to launch mass protests and riots in key population centers in an attempt to render them ungovernable (and if the target government uses disproportionate force in an attempt to suppress them, so much the better); infiltrate SOF disguised as civilians to sabotage infrastructure and take over administrative centers; mount attacks and commit acts of sabotage to inculcate fear and chaos by stretching thin the government’s resources while using intense media attacks to exaggerate the sense of un-governability. Attempts by the targeted government to respond using its own police and armed forces would be deterred by the massed presence of Russian regular forces threatening a conventional military attack from across the border, and neutralized by blockading them in their barracks, bribing their officers, cutting their communications, and using disinformation to break their morale.
  
  
• Attempts by the international community to intervene would be confused and deterred by sustained international media and diplomatic campaigns—and economic disruption—designed to isolate the target country. Uncertainty would be increased by a relentless campaign denying that Russian forces were involved. Previously unheard of political groupings would emerge, which by seizing administrative control, would shroud the Russian-sponsored alternative power centers in quasi-legitimacy.
  
  

The operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine both opened with the appearance of men in unmarked Russian uniforms (“little green men”), in unmarked Russian vehicles, carrying Russian military-issue weapons. They established barricades and checkpoints and blockaded Ukrainian army and police bases, making it clear that force would be used if the units inside attempted to leave.[27]
Political targets were of primary importance. The Crimean parliament building was occupied on February 27, 2014, effectively ending local decision making.[28] Similarly in Donetsk, the regional state administrative office was one of the first targets when the occupation began in April 2014. It remains the headquarters of the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic. At the same time, well-drilled demonstrators in civilian clothes (though often carrying guns) occupied less-defended government buildings, media outlets, and critical infrastructure.
Throughout, Russian official spokesmen and domestic media consistently denied that the troops were Russian, and described the demonstrators as members of the “opposition” or the “resistance.” However, on April 17, 2014, Putin admitted that Russian troops had been present, and on March 15, 2015, triumphantly tore down the whole fiction in an elaborate TV documentary.[29] Gratuitously, he made a point of saying that he had “considered” placing Russia’s strategic nuclear forces on alert at the same time.[30]
This denial policy must be considered a clear success. If Russia were to attack a member of NATO—say, one of the Baltic states—Moscow would undoubtedly mount a similar, but likely more intense, denial campaign to at least slow down the invocation of NATO’s Article 5 commitment to mutual self-defense, and to isolate and demoralize the government and population of the target country.[31]
Phase Three: Consolidating Power. The proponents of NGW recognize that occupation is insufficient for achieving a fait accompli; an alternative government must be installed, however manufactured its legitimacy may be.

• This legitimacy hinges on a referendum on secession or independence taking place quickly with strong Russian backing and media support. Once the correct answer has been obtained, Russia is able either to provide larger quantities of support openly or establish a military presence that fights, openly or covertly, alongside the “resistance” to the original government as it defends the newly established state. “A sub-variant,” as Rácz puts it, “is an open invasion under the pretext of ‘peacekeeping’ or ‘crisis management.’”
  
  
• The original state would be confronted by two enormous problems: First, the loss of territory would mean economic and political dislocation, currency devaluation, loss of taxation income, and thus a significant weakening in its international economic standing—problems that may be made worse by fleeing refugees and a humanitarian crisis.[32]
  
  
• The Crimean vote was superficially successful with reportedly 97 percent of the population voting to secede on an 80 percent turnout. Putin used these results to publicly justify Russian intervention in his March 2015 broadcast. In fact, as the Russian Human Rights Council inadvertently admitted later, turnout was only 30 percent, half of whom voted against independence, meaning that Russia gained the support of only 15 percent of the population.
  
  

In eastern Ukraine, the initial intervention overthrew the local administrations in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. However, without the presence of Russian bases, as existed in Crimea, and the pressure these could be used to exert on elites and the general population, support for secession remained low. All the irregular forces could do was to hold the two regions in a political and military limbo. Recognizing this, the Ukrainian government launched a counter-offensive, the Anti-Terror Operation (ATO), on April 15, 2014. Initially it could not be regarded as a success.
In May, the Russian-sponsored separatists held referenda in the two territories with results (unsurprisingly) in line with those registered in Crimea. However, following the election of Petro Poroshenko as president of Ukraine on May 25, 2014, the ATO gained new momentum. While the separatists and their Russian backers were able to use NGW methods to undermine and significantly weaken Ukraine, like other irregular forces and irregular methods they were unable to sustain their position in the face of the advancing Ukrainian regular formations.
Russia could have withdrawn its support at this point. It chose, instead, to launch an invasion and initiate a conventional, if limited, inter-state war. For the second time in two years Russia abrogated the Budapest Memorandum it signed in 1994 committing it to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.”[33] For the second time in two years the other signatories to the treaty, the United States and the United Kingdom, while under no treaty obligation to do so, nonetheless failed to provide Ukraine with the political, economic, and large-scale military assistance it needed to prevent its dismemberment.

What War Are We Fighting?

Clausewitz exhorts political leaders and military commanders to understand clearly the enemy and the war upon which they are engaged.[34] The current confusion over terminology invites practitioners to both overestimate and underestimate Russia’s ability to fight NGW, and run the risk of being ill-prepared for similar campaigns in the future.
NGW is referred to widely in the West as “hybrid” warfare. Other terms including “ambiguous,” “gray zone challenges,” and “non-linear” have also been used, but hybrid was the term adopted by NATO.[35] The term hybrid was first linked with warfare by William Nemeth in his Naval Postgraduate School thesis on the Chechen war in which he proposed that for the Chechens the war amounted to much more than the battlefield itself. Militarily they brought together regular and irregular methods in a highly flexible combination. However, they also perceived war “in a wider, non-linear sense and hence, in addition to field tactics, they also employed all the means of the information age to gain an advantage over their enemies.” In Nemeth’s estimation this style of warfare was made possible by the structure of Chechen society and was specific to it.[36]
Two American scholars who studied the phenomenon subsequently, Michael McCuen and Frank Hoffman, did not view it as society-specific. For McCuen, hybrid conflicts were “full spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone’s indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community.”[37] He drew two critical lessons from his reading of these conflicts: The first was that hybrid warfare required simultaneous success on all fronts instead of following the sequential form of conventional warfare; the second was that in order to win hybrid conflicts, military victories had to be followed immediately by social reconstruction to prevent the opponent from filling the vacuum.[38]
Hoffman came to hybrid war by studying Hezbollah in its 1992 war with Israel. His conclusion was that hybrid threats

incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder…[and] are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of the conflict.[39]

For Nemeth and McCuen, hybrid warfare was practiced by non-state actors; for Hoffman, it could be practiced by states as well.[40] The Soviet Union was the first state to practice hybrid warfare (against Estonia and Finland), establishing a pattern that Nazi Germany followed against Czechoslovakia and Austria, and to which Russia is now returning. In Hoffman’s view, hybrid warfare does not signal the end of conventional warfare, but adds a further layer of complexity to the way violent actors fight to win.[41]
A third American, Russell Glenn, added additional dimensions to hybridized warfare when he argued that any definition that focused predominantly on the use of force and violence and underplayed the use of political, diplomatic, and economic tools was turning a blind eye to critical aspects of this new form of war.[42] Grasping this is essential to understanding what Russia is doing. For Glenn, hybrid warfare involves state and non-state actors, singly or in combination, that “simultaneously and adaptively employ some combination of (1) political, military, economic, social, and information means, and (2) conventional, irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and disruptive/criminal warfare methods.”[43] This definition accords strikingly with the observed actions of Russian forces and the Russian government during the takeover of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine.[44]
Glenn’s definition, the Gerasimov Doctrine, and the behavior of Russian forces starting with the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and developing through the Crimean and eastern Ukrainian crises, all link back directly to the revolutionary warfare theories of Lenin and early Bolshevik practice. NGW is also reflected in Mao, in more recent Chinese thinking about psychological, legal, and media warfare, which is referred to together as the “Three Warfares,” and the theories of “Unrestricted Warfare” articulated by two People’s Liberation Army colonels in 2002.[45] Consequently, the world is likely to see further examples of this warfare around Asia’s periphery.
But Nemeth made another salient comment about hybrid warfare: Its nature, he wrote, is “total.”[46] It blurs the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. The Chechens had no compunction in using terrorism, massacres, criminal methods, and the inhumane treatment of prisoners. Glenn similarly saw potentially no theoretical limit preventing the use of every weapon up to and including acts of catastrophic terrorism that could include the destruction of dams and nuclear power plants.[47]
Current Russian strategic thinking as embodied in the NGW concept is clearly guided by the Leninist view of warfare; that is to say its only limit is what is possible and expedient politically. Putin is nothing if not an opportunist. While Russia’s domestic and economic policies are no longer guided by Marxist-Leninism, Putin has filled the resulting hole with nationalism. Putin and the current Russian elite have embraced the idea of Greater Russia. They have married the expansionist nationalism of the tsars to the absolutist military strategy of Lenin. Given Russia’s continuing research, development, and manufacture of biological and chemical weapons, and its investment in low-yield nuclear weapons, these too could conceivably play a role in future confrontations while staying true to the NGW formula. It is worth recalling that Leninism never assumed it had the support of the people; it always came to power by seizing it.
Continuing to refer to NGW as hybrid war may, therefore, blur understanding of its true nature. It may circumscribe the West’s response by encouraging the belief that what the West is facing is a sub-set of conventional war, a variation that might be best viewed as a complication, when in fact it is total war that can be escalated without limit. NGW is a concept for fighting total war in Europe that borrows many of its features from what the Russians encountered—and learnt from—during the brutal fighting in Chechnya.[48] It envisages achieving effect across all fronts—political, economic, informational, and cyber—simultaneously. It aims to achieve its objectives through fear and intimidation without launching a large-scale attack. If conventional fighting is required, however, it is highly networked and multidirectional; the stakes, moreover, can be raised rapidly and possibly without limit. Russia has brought total war back to Europe—in a hidden, undeclared, and ambiguous form.

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