Re: Et en Russie !

[Matt]

Sur twitter, je voyais un comparatif entre les forces russes et turques . . . sur place.
Pas à l'avantage des russes bien sûr.
Bon, ça vaut ce que ça vaut aussi . . . 

[Александр]

Rencontre Hollande-Poutine: le difficile compromis


François Hollande se retrouve coincé entre la stratégie américaine et les ambitions russes. - Alain Jocard - AFP

François Hollande poursuit son marathon diplomatique et rencontre Vladimir Poutine, jeudi. Au menu: la lutte contre Daesh en Syrie. Un entretien qui va difficilement aboutir sur un accord alors que le président français est écartelé entre les exigences américaines et la stratégie de Moscou.


François Hollande va défendre une nouvelle fois la grande coalition internationale pour agir en Syrie qu'il a plusieurs fois appelé de ses voeux au lendemain des attentats du 13 novembre à Paris et Saint-Denis. Après une visite à Barack Obama mardi et un entretien avec la chancelière allemande, Angela Merkel, mercredi, le président français s'envole jeudi pour Moscou où il rencontrera Vladimir Poutine.

L'enjeu est de taille pour François Hollande qui va devoir concilier la stratégie américaine sur l'intervention en Syrie et la lutte contre Daesh, qui ne va pas évoluer au vu des dernières déclarations du président américain, et l'ambiguïté de Moscou quant à sa façon de mener le combat contre le terrorisme.

"On est probablement plus enclin à travailler avec M. Poutine que M. Obama ne l'est à ce stade", prévenait une source diplomatique française à l'issue du déplacement de François Hollande à Washington.

Obama et Hollande à l'unisson

L'un des sujets principaux de la rencontre entre François Hollande et Vladimir Poutine devrait porter sur le sort de Bachar al-Assad. Quelques jours après les attaques du 13 novembre, Sergueï Lavrov qualifiait d'"inacceptable" d'exiger le départ du président syrien comme "condition préalable à toute union contre le terrorisme". "J'espère qu'il y aura un changement de position chez nos autres partenaires occidentaux", expliquait-il. 


Cette aspiration semble déjà s'éloigner. Les Etats-Unis se targuent d'être à l'origine de 90% des frappes en Irak et en Syrie menées par la coalition actuelle. Ils considèrent donc la France comme un allié, parmi d'autres. Si Barack Obama et François Hollande, à l'unisson, ont réaffirmé mardi leur volonté d'intensifier les attaques ciblées contre des positions de l'Etat islamique, aucun des deux chefs d'Etat ne s'est prononcé pour une intervention au sol.

"Etat-major commun"

Pis, François Hollande, dont le langage sur Bachar al-Assad a changé après les attentats du 13 novembre, s'est seulement engagé, aux côtés de son homologue américain, à reporter le départ du président syrien. Un départ jusqu'alors présenté comme une pré-requis à une entente avec Moscou pour lutter contre l'Etat islamique en Syrie.

Pourtant, la Russie ne cesse, cette semaine, d'afficher sa volonté de participer à une grande coalition mondiale. Et ce malgré, l'incident diplomatique après qu'un avion russe a été abattu par la Turquie.

"Nous sommes prêts à (...) planifier ensemble des frappes sur les positions de Daech et constituer pour cela un état-major commun avec la France, avec l'Amérique, avec tous les pays qui veulent bien aller dans cette coalition", assurait mercredi sur Europe 1 Alexandre Orlov, l'ambassadeur russe en France.

Sauf que les Etats-Unis et la France accusent toujours Moscou de cibler les positions des opposants à Bachar al-Assad et non celles de l'Etat islamique. "Demain (mardi, NDLR), je dirai au président Poutine que c'est contre Daesh que nous devons tous agir et que nous devons déployer nos moyens", a réaffirmé François Hollande mercredi soir lors d'une conférence de presse commune avec Angela Merkel.

Discussions parallèles

De son côté, Barack Obama a clairement averti les Russes: si le Kremlin ne change pas de stratégie, la coopération sera "très difficile". "Si leur priorité est d'attaquer l'opposition modérée qui pourrait faire partie d'un futur gouvernement syrien, la Russie n'aura pas le soutien de notre coalition", a insisté le président américain.

Un troisième front attend François Hollande, cette fois-ci, au niveau national. "Je n’ai pas attendu le 13 novembre pour dire que Moscou devait être intégré à une coalition internationale. Au lieu de cela, nous avons préféré engager un bras de fer avec la Russie, lui imposer des sanctions, l’écarter du G8, lui refuser la vente de nos Mistral…", a scandé l'ancien Premier ministre, François Fillon à l'Assemblée nationale ce mercredi. Rappelant au passage que la Russie et les Etats-Unis n'ont pas attendus la France pour engager des discussions parallèles cet été.

[Александр]

Confirmation:

La Russie renforce ses contrôles sur les produits alimentaires importés de Turquie (ministère)

La Russie a décidé de renforcer ses contrôles sur les produits agricoles et alimentaires importés de Turquie, citant des violations des normes sanitaires, a annoncé jeudi le ministère de l'Agriculture deux jours après le crash d'un bombardier russe abattu par l'aviation turque.

Cité dans un communiqué, le ministre de l'Agriculture Alexandre Tkatchev évoque des "violations répétées des normes russes par les producteurs turcs", qui pourraient concerner environ 15% des produits agricoles importés du pays.

Il cite la présence de "substances interdites et nuisibles" ainsi que des doses excessives de pesticides ou nitrates.

Le gouvernement a donc ordonné à l'agence chargée de la sécurité phytosanitaire Rosselkhoznadzor de renforcer ses contrôles sur les "produits agricoles et alimentaires" importés de Turquie et "d'organiser des vérifications supplémentaires à la frontière et sur les lieux de production en Turquie".

Depuis des années, la Russie est régulièrement accusée de prendre des décisions sanitaires en fonction de ses positions géopolitiques, de la Géorgie à l'Ukraine.

Elle impose depuis l'été 2014 un embargo sur la plupart des produits alimentaires des pays occidentaux qui la sanctionnent pour son implication présumée dans la crise ukrainienne, ce qui affecte durement les agriculteurs européens. Cette mesure doit être étendue au 1er janvier à l'Ukraine.

La Turquie est un gros exportateur de fruits et légumes et un important fournisseur pour la Russie.

A la télévision mercredi, Alexandre Tkatchev avait assuré que la Russie pourrait s'approvisionner ailleurs en cas d'embargo sur les produits turcs. "Nous remplacerons les importations de légumes, surtout des tomates, par d'autres pays: l'Iran, le Maroc, Israël, l'Azerbaïdjan, l'Ouzbékistan", a précisé le ministre.

Le ministre russe des Affaires étrangères Sergueï Lavrov a prévenu mercredi que Moscou allait "sérieusement réévaluer" les relations avec Ankara après que l'aviation turque a abattu un bombardier russe à la frontière syrienne.

Cet incident, le plus grave survenu entre Moscou et Ankara depuis le début de l'intervention militaire russe en Syrie il y a deux mois, a coûté la vie à deux militaires russes, l'un des deux pilotes et un militaire participant à une opération de sauvetage qui a été tué après que l'hélicoptère de son commando avait été lui aussi abattu.

Dès lundi soir, Moscou avait déconseillé à ses concitoyens de se rendre en Turquie, destination touristique préférée des Russes.

How the Kremlin turns extremist attacks to its own advantage


People place photos of victims of a Russian airliner which crashed in Egypt, during a commemoration meeting at Dvortsovaya Square in St. Petersburg, Russia November 1, 2015. REUTERS/Peter Kovalev


As French President Francois Hollande visits both Washington and Moscow to solicit aid in fighting Islamic State (IS), which has claimed responsibility for the attacks in Paris that claimed 130 lives, his options seem few.



Where the European allies are seemingly incapable and unwilling to confront the issues at hand, Russia, which already has a military presence on Syrian soil, has said that it is willing to shift its bombing focus from the Syrian opposition to areas controlled by IS. Russia is also a recent victim of the group, with the downing of MetroJet Flight 9268 by a bomb planted aboard. The United States, desirous only of avoiding yet another Middle Eastern war, but worried by the unraveling of regional order and growing humanitarian disaster, seems willing to go along with the idea of a U.S.-French-Russian anti-IS coalition.



But both Holland and President Barack Obama should be on their guard. In past situations, Putin and his Kremlin have made a habit of responding to tragic events and terror attacks only in ways that they believe will benefit them politically. There is no reason to believe that pattern will change now.



If, as it seems will happen, U.S. and French leadership do decide to work in conjunction with the Russians in Syria, they must take that step with their eyes wide open. Vladimir Putin — the same man who insisted that Russian troops were not in Crimea, and said Russian soldiers had nothing to do with violence in eastern Ukraine — is not a good-faith actor. The Kremlin is not a trustworthy ally, nor is it now in their interest to really and truly combat IS.



Russia’s goals in involving itself militarily in Syria, remain very different from U.S. and French aims. Though many have assumed that the deaths of 219 Russians at the hands of IS-related terrorists will change the Kremlin’s calculations, we must remember that Russia has always responded much differently to terrorism than has the West.



A short history of Russia, Putin, and terror



In 1999, just after Putin was made Prime Minister by then-President Boris Yeltsin, three apartment buildings in three different Russian cities were blown up, killing nearly 300. These attacks, the origins of which have never been confirmed, were blamed on Chechen terrorists. The day after a similar attack was foiled in the city of Ryazan, Putin launched air strikes against the Chechen capital, starting the Second Chechen War.



In 2000, a Russian nuclear submarine, the Kursk, sank in the Barents Sea with 118 on board. At the time, Russia’s media was relatively free, and it was unashamed in broadcasting the reality of the military and government incompetence that had made the accident possible. It was that honestly that spelled the beginning of the end for free Russian media, especially since most Russians receive their news through the television. Very quickly, two of Russia’s most-watched TV channels, NTV and ORT, came under the Kremlin’s control.



In 2004, a year of many deadly terror attacks in Russia, a school in the North Caucasus was taken by Chechen terrorists. Nearly one-third of the 1,100 hostages were killed in the siege, a number that the media struggled to keep under wraps. Mr. Putin took the opportunity to further consolidate his power, ended the local election of governors, and gave himself the power to appoint them. At the time, he said: “Under current conditions, the system of executive power in the country should not just be adapted to operating in crisis situations, but should be radically restructured in order to strengthen the unity of the country and prevent further crises.”



Serving the state, not the other way around



The Kremlin’s reactions to these events highlight a key difference between the Western and Russian understanding of the role of the state. While Western nations largely consider the state to be in the service of the citizens that have established and nurtured it, the Russian understanding is the opposite. In Russia, the people are to serve the state, which exists to prevent the blossoming of chaos. The existence and survival of the state is of higher importance than the people which belong to that state. “While Mother Russia must be protected,” write Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, “she does not necessarily protect her own citizens.”



It is this understanding which informs Russian actions in Syria. Where the West seems more concerned about the humanitarian situation in Syria and the millions of displaced persons, Russia’s key concern remains the continued existence of the Syrian state and the preservation of Bashar al-Assad as the rightful leader of Syria. Neither the crash of the MetroJet plane nor the loss of life in Paris has changed that ultimate intention. To give in wholesale to Western demands that Assad must go would be, for the Kremlin, an admission that the very foundations of Russian statehood are illegitimate. Worse, it might open the possibility of the future destruction of the Russian state.



For Russia, then, the destruction of the Islamic State is only a secondary concern. Since it declared common cause with France on November 17, Russia has made a show of increasing its bombing of IS positions in Syria. But it is exactly that, a show. In reality, their old bombing patterns –in which they claimed to be targeting IS but were largely bombing those who stand in opposition to Assad — largely remain the same. In fact, by largely bombing groups opposed to Assad, Russia has been tacitly assisting IS in its mission. Even IS itself notes that it is not being very much targeted by Russian bombing raids, and that those sorties are still largely focused on the opposition strongholds in cities like Aleppo.



As they meet in Vienna to discuss Syria’s future, and meet with each other to discuss a possible alignment with Russia in the fight against IS, Western leaders must bear these realities all in mind. There may be little appetite in the West for more wars, but outsourcing our dirty work to a Russia with vastly different goals has the potential to produce a set of outcomes that we have not even begun to imagine.

[Александр]

Putin’s Russia. Do traces of KGB, FSB and GRU lead to Islamic State?

Again, this article will not be related to the structure, clans, their interrelations, and KGB basis in Putin’s current regime. This essay is a sequel of the previous piece which aimed to take another glimpse at Putin’s suspicious links with international terrorism. 

This time I decided to draw attention to a significant role (which was a surprise for many experts) of Chechen terrorists in a battle of Islamic state that has become a main threat to the West. Based on this role, it is not only possible, but vital to examine the potential links between the Islamic state and Russian secret services. One of the inspiration sources was the article published in ‘The Huffington Post’ called ‘You Can't Understand ISIS If You Don't Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia’. It was written by Alastair Crooke, a famous expert of the Middle East terrorism, a former diplomat and a ranking figure in British intelligence MI-6.

That article is definitely worth reading for all of those who want to understand more about the phenomenon and threats of the Islamic state. And I don’t even consider arguing with the famous expert, especially when I, myself, do not aspire a career of terrorism expert.

However, after long years of exploring Putin’s current regime and it’s KGB roots, I believe that Crooke’s headline can be rephrased like this: ‘Is it really possible to fully understand the phenomenon of the Islamic state without paying attention to the alleged links between Russian secret services and Chechen terrorists?

Some things are hard to deny

In general, the links between Chechen terrorist and Russian secret services cannot be denied even by those Western experts and commentators who tend to call these links a conspiracy theory. 

The fact that the famous Shamil Basayev, Ruslan Gelayev and some others Chechen terrorist commanders began their career not only fighting on the Russian side during the Georgian-Abkhaz war, but were directly trained by the special forces of Russian military intelligence (GRU), was basically never even denied in Russia. The traces of GRU agents were not a secret as well.

Even Yuri Drozdov, the legend of Russian secret services, former KGB General-Major and a longtime chairman of the board at ‘S’, in his interview for fontanka.ru in 2011 publicly admitted that all this information about Basayev was true. According to Drozdov, Basayev was ‘one of the leaders of a special military division’.

Also undenied is the fact that Basayev’s incursion into Dagestan and house bombing afterwards contributed, to say the least, to Putin’s coming to power. The Western world has less and less doubt that this was all a well-executed, although seemingly unthinkable, operation of Russian secret services.

Whether we read Litvinenko's and Felshtisnky’s book ‘FSB blowing up Russia’, David Satter’s ‘Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State’, John Dunlop’s ‘The Moscow Bombings of September 1999: Examinations of Russian Terrorist Attacks at the Onset of Vladimir Putin's Rule’, or the especially popular investigation carried out by Karen Dawisha, professor at the Miami University, called ‘Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?’, it is difficult to deny the tons of odd coincidences and inexplicable actions of Russian government. In the meantime, Putin’s regime closed all doors to any kind of investigations, and many people, who were trying to shed some light on these allegations, were murdered or died under very strange circumstances.

What are the roots of Chechen’s Wahhabism?

However, this time the examination should not start from the aforementioned allegations. It is worth following Crooke’s example and examine the history of Wahhabism - not only in Saudi Arabia but in Chechnya and the former USSR in general. Because namely the so-called Chechen Wahhabis are now battling for Islamic terrorists - they were always the synonym for the term ‘terrorists’ in Russia.

Russian journalist Sanobar Shermatova, who died in 2011, was considered not only a journalist, but also one of the best Russian experts of Middle Asia and Caucasus. After the events in Chechnya and Dagestan in summer 1999 she wrote a serious analytic piece called ‘The so-called Wahhabis’.

In this essay Shermatova digs into Wahhabism roots not only in Chechnya and Dagestan, but also in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizia. She doesn’t tend to any conspiracy theories, and examines various links of ‘the so-called Wahhabis’ - also with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

But the story begins with the protests in Dunshanbe in autumn 1991 that resulted in Tajikistan government allowing the first free elections and registering the Islamic party (not without the help of Moscow’s go-betweens, including Vladimir Putin and Anatolij Sobczak, who is more likely Putin’s comrade rather than a democrat which he is often referred to - aut. note).

Many authors in Tajikistan itself claim that namely the pressure from Sobczak-led delegation led to Tajikistan’s government decision to register the Islamic party, although it has already been labeled extremists and ‘Wahhabis’ by then.

After emphasising that this Islamic party was merely a ‘branch of USSR Islamic Revival party’, Shermatova continued: ‘Islamic activists played a pretty important role in the opposition. I mean those who were called ‘Wahhabis’ in KGB chronicles. At the time this term was not widely known, and not entirely understood even by those who were called this name. USSR had banned the Islamic literature, and only those few who went to study in Arab countries, had knowledge about Islam history, movements and streams. But these people, as usual, were inspected for their loyalty to KGB, and then included into ‘religious nomenclature’ while constantly being controlled by the special services. Ordinary Muslims were not familiar with Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhabi’s doctrine. In Shermatova’s research and in further investigation of Uzbekistan’s and Kirghizia’s ‘Wahhabis’, KGB traces stretch along the story.

Which theory is more reliable?

Truth is, many other Russian researchers deny any role of the KGB in spreading Wahhabism ideas in the former USSR territory. For example, a famous Russian historian of religion and Islamic researcher Roman Silantyev states that KGB allegedly had no more power to resist this spread. Aleksei Kundryavtsev, associate at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, even claims that the young generation of Islamists turned the Wahhabism direction precisely because the old religious authorities had KGB shadows on them. Other authors elaborate these ideas to a level where it turns out that KGB started to use the name ‘Wahhabis’ on those Muslim activists who were not willing to collaborate with KGB in the first place.

But none of these experts deny that establishing a USSR Islam Revival party was a main element of ‘Wahhabism’ rudiment in the former USSR territory.

In the meantime, Akhmed Zakayev (who then lived in London and was even called the Prime minister of the unrecognised Chechen Republic of Ichkeria), Aslan Maskhadov (former Chechnya’s president) and other so-called representatives of the wing of the secular battle for Chechnya’s independence has long and consistently called many radicals the agents of Russian special services. Zakayev’s attitude towards the aforementioned congress of USSR Islam Revival party in Astrakhan is also unambiguous. 

‘When the the founding congress of USSR Islamic Revival party was held in Astrakhan in 1989 (other sources say 1990, so Zakayev might be mistaken - aut. note), KGB undoubtedly knew what they wanted. Just as Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s liberal democrat party, which has been preventing the true Russian liberal democrats from uniting for two decades now, the branches of USSR Islam Revival party, that have taken roots into in Muslim regions of the former USSR, have successfully separated Muslims by dividing them into ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. This is how Moscow turned Islamic radicalism into an effective vaccine against various nations’ movements for national liberation’, Zakayev explained in his interview back in 2008.

A lot can be said about KGB’s role in these events from the emerged stories that KGB agents were being infiltrated into democratic movements, and tried to control them (see ‘Putin’s Russia. System’s spine - KGB: who was hiding behind Gorbachev’s and Putin’s backs’). It would have been weird if KGB had treated Islamic movement different than the democratic.

Returning to Shermatova’s idea that the rise of Wahhabism can be viewed both through the prism of Islamic Revival party congress and the events in Tajikistan, it is worth noting that there are at least three different witnesses who claim that KGB had consciously provoked the bloody events in Dushanbe in 1990. Their goal was to prevent the liberation movement in Tajikistan which was based on the examples of Ukraine and the Baltic States.

One of these testimonies was published by the then-officer of Tajikistan KGB - Abdul Nazarov. Another was announced by Kakhar Makhmarov, longtime leader of Tajikistan during Soviet days and the first president of Tajikistan. The third testimony was published by Makhmadali Khait, a former activist of folk movement ‘Rastochez’, now the deputy chairman at Tajikistan Islamic Revival party.

In this context it would be hard to believe that KGB did no longer control the situation regarding the spread of Wahhabism in the former USSR territory, let alone made effort that the congress of Islamic Revival party in Astrakhan went according to their scenario. This leads to thinking that the statements of both Shermatova and Zakayev sound much more logical than those claiming that KGB had no role in creating the aforementioned party and during the rise of Wahhabism.


Chechen terrorists forged in Tajikistan



It is also worth speaking about Tajikistan in the context of Wahhabism history in Chechnya because Basayev, ‘one of the leaders of the special purpose military unit’, went to Tajikistan where the political war had already gained momentum by then, and fought in the opposition side.

It is stated that Basayev was personally familiar with Said Abdul Nuri, the leader of United Tajik opposition and Islamic party. Ostensibly this acquaintance led to Khattab moving to Chechnya and becoming Basayev’s loyal comrade.

Moreover, some experts in Armenia claim that Basayev, just like Chechen terrorists Gelayev and Salman Raduyev, who were always linked to Russian special services, fought for Afghanistan side in another war (before Abkhazia) where the examination of the role of Soviet secret services will probably never be complete - in Nagorno-Karabakh. Namely in Nagorno-Karabakh Basayev allegedly met Khattab who was fighting in the same battlefield.

Telling links to Dugin

However, it is worth returning to the congress of USSR Islamic Revival party in Astrakhan and its main players. Though Akhman-Kadi Akhtayev, a modest Islamic teacher from Dagestan, was elected a leader of the party, the names of other organizers speak for themselves. First of all - Geydar Dzhemal, the current chairman at the Russian Islam committee, a longtime companion of Alexander Dugin who earned fame during the aggression in Ukraine.

Although Dzhemal is sometimes even referred to as a dissident of Soviet times, and now turned into Putin’s opponent, this figure is worth taking a closer look. Not only because of his longtime friendship with Dugin. Dzhemal is a grandson of a chairman of Azerbaijani USSR supreme court, formerly a high-ranking officer at the Caucasian NKVD. He started his career in 1965 when he entered the Institute of Oriental languages (later renamed the Institute of Asian and African studies). By the way, the famous Zhirinovsky entered the same institute in 1964).

There are many testimonies on what kind of institution it was and how it was related to USSR secret services. But probably the most eloquent is the one published by a famous Russian journalist Yelena Tregubova in her book ‘The tales of a Kremlin digger’.

The journalist quotes Mikhail Margelov, a former chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of Russia, currently a vice-president of ‘Transneft’. It should be noted that in 1997, when Tregubova published her words, Margelov was only a ‘young PR specialist’

But it is worth noting what he said to journalist’s voice recorder: ‘after my studies at the Institute of Asian and African studies I had two ways - back to KGB or ‘following a party line’. Everything else is only branches of these lines: you can go to APN (press agency ‘Novosti’), to the Ministry of Foreign affairs, and to the ideological department of the Central Committee... Or you end up in the First Chief Directorate (KGB foreign intelligence - aut. note) in Yesenevo’.

However, the official Dzhemal’s biography says that he was expelled from the institute after his first year of studies - allegedly because of the ‘bourgeois nationalism’. Yet it is inexplicable how he managed to land a job at the publishing house when this type of institutions were carefully protected from any kind of ‘anti-Soviet elements’ during USSR times. Also inexplicable is how Dzhemal and Dugin avoided any serious problems with KGB after practicing ‘underground’ activities, spreading fascist ideas and event creating the ‘Black Order of SS’.

It is also difficult to explain why KGB did not take an interest into the fact that Dzhemal allegedly affiliated with Tajikistan Islamists back in 1979. And in 1980 he traveled to Tajikistan together with Dugin - it could hardly be overlooked by the KGB.

Truth is, Dugin’s case is much clearer. It is known that his father Gelyi Dugin was a general-lieutenant at GRU. In 1990-1992 Dugin himself was granted unprecedented access to the secret KGB archives, despite his alleged underground activities, and he later admitted that his first geopolitical textbook was written under a ‘closed regime in General Staff Academy’. Looks like the invisible hand of GRU protected Dugin during other career steps as well, thus it can be assumed that he had always been a GRU man.

It can explain things that seem inexplicable in Dzhemal’s biography - it doesn’t matter whether he personally collaborated with GRU or KGB - for those who know USSR reality, the trace of secret services seems highly likely in this case. 

By the way, after the spread of Wahhabism in USSR territory Dzhemal had publicly supported the actions of Chechen Wahhabis or even justified terror acts numerous times. However, even under Putin’s regime, he managed to avoid the attention of Russian law enforcement for many years by some miracle.

In summer 2009 Maksim Mishchenko (deputy of the State Duma, founder and leader of the youth movement ‘Young Russia’) made an official address to the Russian prosecutor general’s office regarding Dzhemal’s extremist public announcements. He demanded that the Islamic committee was declared an extremist organization, and Dzhemal was prosecuted. But again - no result.

Dzhemal was inviolable until March 2012 when he could no longer avoid the persecution against Putin’s critics after the end of 2011 and the mass protests in the beginning of 2012. FSB performed a search at his house and allegedly found extremist literature. Nevertheless, although the proceedings were instituted, Dzhemal enjoys freedom and active social lifestyle, unlike other leaders of the ‘Left front’.

A net of KGB agents

Dzhemal’s involvement in creating USSR Islamic Revival party, of course, is not a sufficient evidence of a link between Chechen Wahhabism and Russian secret services. Especially when he can only indirectly be called a supporter of Wahhabism - at least in public he prefers to be referred to as a representative of Russian Islam in general.

So let’s take look at other famous figures from the congress in Astrakhan. Among them, apart from Basayev and Nuri, is Bagautdin Kebedov, a leader of Dagestan’s Wahhabis and active organizer of Basayev’s intrusion into Caucasus republic.

But the most attention should be drawn to the two Chechens who are considered not just representatives of the radical wing, but ideologists of Wahhabism. One of them - Adam Deniyev - was openly called ‘Wahhabi’ back in 1989 by the officers at the Religious board under the Chechnya-Ingush council of ministers. He denied his belonging to this Islam radical movement at the time, but nowadays even the researchers of ‘Wahhabism’ in USSR consider this man one of the first ideologists of Wahhabism in Chechnya.

Apart from the aforementioned titles, Deniyev was also a longtime KGB and FSB agent. At least he was called that by various sources not only in Chechnya but in Russian media.

For example, ‘Nezavisamaya Gazeta’ wrote after Deniyev’s death in 2001: ‘Upon his visit in Baghdad, president Dzhokhar Dudayev informed Iraq’s government about the links between Deniyev (who went to Iraq to study in 1992 after unsuccessful attempts to take roots in Chechnya - aut. note) and Russian FSB. It was probably the first accusation for Deniyev regarding his connections with special services. Later on these accusations were following him constantly’.

In 2000, after the Russian forces uptake in Chechnya, when Deniyev was appointed the deputy of Akhmad Kadyrov, Chief Mufti of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, gazeta.ru announced that, according to their sources, Deniyev was not only an FSB agent, but would also be executing a special FSB operation in the republic’s government.

Andrei Babitsky, a famous Russian journalist, also called Deniyev an FSB agent and even accused him of kidnapping. Deniyev publicly responded that he had never been related to any special services, but “if he was a KGB agent, he would definitely be proud of that’. Deniyev has never hidden his pro-Russian position, at least after the second Chechen war. It is also known that his brother was a high-ranking officer at Chechen FSB.

There is also enough evidence in Russian media about Supyan Abdullayev (another ideologist of Wahhabism and one of the main initiators of creating a USSR Islamic Revival party) and his links with special services. But in this context it is important to emphasize not the testimonies themselves, but the fact that Abdullayev, according to these evidence, started to collaborate with KGB well before founding the USSR Islam Revival party.

For example, in 1999 (already in the current regime) ‘Moskovskij Komsomolets’ wrote: ‘Abdullayev demonstrated radical views well before the collapse of USSR and organizing the ‘Islam Revival Party’. According to some sources, Abdullayev was recruited by KGB officers back in 1980s’.

Zakayev’s insights worth noting?

So the creation of the party itself should raise serious suspicions about the key role of KGB in these processes - whether we believe Zakayev’s testimony, or not. The rudiment of Wahhabism in Chechnya is apparently also related to the suspected KGB agents.

But now we have to talk not only about historic consequences. Because Abdulayev, until his death in 2011, was the main comrade and ideologist of Dokka Umarov, leader of Caucasian emirate. And namely the role of Umarov and his other companions (also the creators of USSR Islam Revival party) is especially important talking about the current fight of Chechen Wahhabis in the Islamic state.

But first let’s go back to June 4, 2013, when the world spoke very little about the Chechens fighting in Syria. That exact day Zakayev gave a very interesting interview to radio station ‘Radio Svoboda’.

When asked about the rumours that Umarov had passed away, Zakayev put a whole theory that is definitely worth quoting: ‘according to our sources, the information about Umarov’s death is false; he is alive and healthy. The thing is that Russia, its special services and Vladimir Putin are once again preparing a surprise for theirWestern partners who are involved in intense negotiation on Syria’s situation. 

Syria witnessed confronting forces who not only fought for Assad (Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad; in 2011 a revolutions against him started in Syria - aut. note) or against Assad: they represent different influence areas - the Western world that wants to leave Russia without its last foothold in the Middle East, and Russia which understands that losing the influence in Syria means losing influence in the whole Middle East region. Therefore Russia is interested in delaying or overall preventing the process of Assad’s withdrawal. To do so, according to our information, Kremlin made a decision to transfer Umarov to Syria.

And what does Umarov’s show-up in Syria (at the opposition fighting against Assad) really mean? After all, Russia claims that for Assad opposition is not some sort of political forces or state’s population, but merely dregs from all around the world, the so-called Islam radicals who promote the global ideology of Jihad. Can you imagine what position the Western leaders, who made the decision to lift embargo of arms for the opposition, will be put in? Dokka Umarov’s show-up in Syria will become an evidence that the opposition has criminal organizations among its ranks. Moreover, those organizations have been declared terrorist by the UN and various other states.’

A journalist, in his own view, found this version ‘interesting but very extravagant’, so he asked straightforwardly whether such response of Zakayev meant that Umarov was related to Russian special services.

To which Zakayev responded calmly: “We announced it many times. In 2007 Umarov declared war to America, Great Britain and Israel. Before this statement, Dokka was in the radar of Russian secret services, but was released by some miracle, and announced this statement. Umarov is under full command of Russian special services. To this day he was (and will be, I’m sure) performing the tasks assigned to him by these structures. The emerging of his organization in Northern Caucasus complied with Kremlin’s interests because it kind of proved this: Chechnya is not fighting for independence and statehood, but rather for creating a caliphate “from sea to sea”. Russian propaganda was trying to show to the world that the ones fighting in Chechnya are not freedom fighters but radicals who will put all effort to recreate caliphate, and are the enemies of civilized world’.

In this interview Zakayev also stated that “according to our sources, Umarov’s main ideologist and the main author of emirate concept - Isa Umarov- is already is Syria. A few days ago he announced that the epicenter of events is namely there, and that all supporters of jihad have to be in Syria.’

Looking back to those weird (at the time) statements from today’s perspective, we can notice that everything basically came true. Umarov, of course, did not show up in Syria, but was murdered after less than a year - in winter or spring in 2014. Meanwhile, Omar al-Shishani (real name Tarkhan Batirashvili), who suddenly rose to power at Islamic state, admits openly that he came to Syria under Umarov’s command.

The rise of Wahhabis provides a lot of pabulum to Russian propaganda and political games. Based on various sources in Syria itself it can be assumed that Umarov certainly is in Syria. And it looks like he is involved in recruiting new terrorists to Islamic state. It was stated by Usman Ferzauli, a self-proclaimed Ichkeria’s minister of foreign affairs, in his interview for Russian newspaper ‘Komersant’ on July 26, 2013.

Wahhabism, Georgian intelligence or GRU?

But let’s take a sharper look at Chechens themselves (their biographies, to be specific) in Islamic state’s government which has been considered the biggest threat to the West lately. Especially in the context of other vague links between Russian regime and Islam terrorists- both in terms of what was written in this essay, and the historic parallels in my previous essay ‘Putin’s Russia. Will Kremlin get away with this again?’

These two Chechens (originally from Pankisia, Georgia) are the aforementioned al-Shishani and Muslim Abu Walid al Shishani (real name Murad Margoshvili). The two were included into the list of the most wanted terrorists in US.

A famous British journalist and blogger Joana Paraszczuk, who is currently focusing on Chechen battle in Syria, wrote in one of her pieces about the ‘ridiculous conspiracy theory that al-Shishani is actually a KGB agent’.

Since al-Shishani is only 28 year old, this theory might seem ridiculous at first glance. When USSR collapsed and KGB was reorganized into other Russian secret services, the kid was just 5 years old. But it is important to note that these rumours are also circulating among the Chechens who are fighting in Syria. Moreover, the journalist herself thinks that it is vital to publish such rumours, and adds that they are also related to the opinion that Umarov has a strong influence on al-Shishani.

At first glance it seems that other al-Shishani’s biography facts would deny even the slightest possibility that al-Shishani is an agent of Russian secret services. It is widely known that Batirashvili (al-Shishani’s real name) was serving in Georgian army and fighting against Russian aggression in 2008. Some say he was an agent of Georgian special services or at least the special divisions of Georgian army. 

But Batirashvili’s biography is worth taking a closer look. Especially interesting details were provided by his father Teimuraz Batirashvili who is an orthodox, not Islamist. He told that until the arrest for illegal possession of weapons his son was not a Wahhabi or Islamist in general. According to father, al-Shishani ended up in Syria not because of religion. He simply wanted to make money.

But the most interesting detail is that Batirashvili apparently started his career not in Georgian army but in Gelayev’s terrorist squad when he was barely 14.

The information calls for serious investigation because Gelayev, who had GRU traces stretched behind him for many years, was hiding in Pankisia at the time, and in 2001 he actually participated in the attack in Abkhazia (which was mentioned by Batirashvili’s dad). But this time Galayev was not on Russian side but allegedly aiming to help Georgia win back Abkhazia.

Gelayev’s attack is best illustrated by Irakli Alasania, former Georgian defence minister, in his interview for Georgian press in 2009. In this interview Alasania openly stated that Gelayev and his squad was a ‘weapon against Georgians in GRU hands’ during the attack in Abkhazia. 

Knowing such an eloquent detail of Shishani’s career sunrise, all the aforementioned information about suspicious links between Wahhabis and Russian secret services, Zakayev’s statements in 2013 about the upcoming Chechen role in Syria, and the testimonies of Batirashvili’s father, the theory that this character has suspicious associations (not with KGB but with, say, GRU or FSB) sounds dramatically different. And this possibility should be examined more thoroughly

Terrorist who walked free

Muslim Abu Walid’s biography should raise even more thoughts. When this man was known as Margoshvili, he was arrested for terrorism in Russia, and released after two years.

Simply reading what Russian media wrote in 2003, when Margoshvili was arrested, it seemed obvious that this guy, responsible for deaths of many people, was never to see daylight again. But by some miracle he was first sentenced to two years in prison, and then suddenly acquitted during retrial.

If it wasn’t enough, a strange story happened in courtroom - FSB officers were allegedly trying to arrest him after the acquittal, however unsuccessfully. According to experts, this can only mean one thing - Margoshvili became (or have already been) an agent of Russian special services.

Not too many consistent coincidences?

By the way, Walid became a headache not only to those worrying about the war in Syria, but to, say, Germany. In the beginning of December, a newspaper ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine’ announced that the diaspora of Chechen natives is radializing, and the biggest contributors are Walid and Shishani who has allegedly become ‘an idol of German Islamists’.

Such information would be yet another reason to examine the real story of Margoshvili - especially knowing KGB traditions to direct their agents towards weakening Western states, the unexpected story of al-Zawahiri’s (Al Qaeda’s leader) potential links to Russian special services, and the fact that many experts finally admit that the Islamic state is a bigger threat to the West than Al Qaeda.

All of this information is in no way an attempt to prove that all Islamic terrorism is directed only by Russian secret services. This is not the case. I perfectly understand that this issue is much more complex.

It would be ignorant to deny various historic facts about the links between Islam terrorists and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Middle East, and the never ending conflicts in these regions. There even is a basis to talk about the current links between some of the Muslim states and terrorism.

There are various attitudes to such theories as the one presented by Drozdov in his interview for ‘fontanka.ru’. Although he admits that Basayev was one of the leaders of a special purpose military unit, he argues that it is merely Russia’s mistake - the same one USA made regarding bin Laden. KGB general-major had in mind the undenied theory that US supported bin Laden when they provided support to mujahideen during Afghanistan war against USSR.

But there is a basic difference between Muslim or Western states and Russia when it comes to links with terrorism. First of all, if a Western or Muslim state is accused of such links, the story receives media coverage, the facts are examined and researched. However, it seems that Russia is immune to international research or public discussions although the allegations are long-term and consistent. There is no other state (having in mind the undoubtful USSR traditions that Russia might have adopted) that can be suspected for including terrorism in its arsenal and strategies for fighting in international arena.

So I would like to finish this piece not only by encouraging you to reevaluate all these allegation and threats to the Western states. I’d like to remind once again the Preobrazhensky’s warning in 2007:

‘The basic difference between Russia’s and America’s attitude towards Islamic terrorist is that America regards it as an external threat, while Russia employs terrorism as an object and government tool both internally and abroad. Islamic terrorism is only a part of international terrorism. KGB was using terrorism to spread communist regime principles all over the world, and it was well before Islamic terrorism became a global threat.

‘After this quote and all the information presented in this essay, the rhetoric question arises: ‘Doesn’t Putin’s current regime use terrorism cynically to reach the same victories - both internally and against the West?’

----Marius Laurinavičius is senior analyst at the Vilnius-based Eastern Europe Studies Centre

[Александр]

La Russie prépare des mesures de rétorsions économiques contre la Turquie



Le Premier ministre russe Dmitri Medvedev a demandé jeudi à son gouvernement de préparer d'ici à deux jours une série de mesures de rétorsions économiques après "l'acte d'agression" de la Turquie qui a abattu mardi un bombardier russe à la frontière syrienne.

Ces mesures concerneront aussi bien le commerce que les investissements ainsi que l'emploi de main d'oeuvre, le tourisme, le transport aérien ou encore la sphère culturelle, a précisé le chef du gouvernement lors d'un conseil des ministres retransmis à la télévision.

M. Medvedev a demandé au gouvernement "de mettre en oeuvre un ensemble de mesures, dans les sphères économiques et culturelles, en réaction à l'acte d'agression", de la Turquie.
"Je propose que tout cela soit fait dans un délai de deux jours afin de passer le plus vite possible aux procédures nécessaires", a-t-il précisé.

Sans entrer dans les détails, il a laissé entendre que des projets conjoints pourraient être suspendus, les droits de douanes augmentés, les déplacements des avions turcs dans l'espace aérien russe limités comme celui des bateaux turcs dans les eaux territoriales russes. L'utilisation de la main d'oeuvre turque en Russie pourrait aussi être affectée.

Il a cité de possibles limitations aux importations de produits alimentaires turcs, alors que le ministère de l'Agriculture a annoncé dès jeudi matin un renforcement des contrôles, officiellement pour des motifs sanitaires.

Selon M. Medvedev, "des accords et projets d'investissements pourront être gelés ou tout simplement abandonnés", a-t-il prévenu.

L'aviation turque a abattu mardi près de la frontière syrienne un avion russe Su-24 qui revenait d'une mission de combat. Ankara affirme que l'appareil volait dans son espace aérien et qu'il a été averti "dix fois en cinq minutes", tandis que Moscou assure qu'il survolait le territoire syrien et n'a pas été prévenu avant d'être touché.

Un des deux pilotes à bord a été tué depuis le sol alors qu'il descendait en parachute, selon Moscou. Le deuxième a regagné sa base après deux opérations de sauvetage qui ont coûté la vie à un soldat russe.

[Caduce62]

[Caduce62]

Fini les vacances à l'étranger, on a la même chose à la maison 

[Matt]

J'ai vus hier sur twitter que le big boss de Vtb bank conseillait d'aller en Crimée plutôt qu'en Turquie.
Va y avoir du peuple en Crimée, contrairement à ce qui se passe en réalité depuis le vol par la Russie.

[Александр]

Et ça continue:

La Russie bannit les ONG du milliardaire américain George Soros

Zoom
George Soros en janvier 2013. Photo Eric Piermont. AFP Le tournant anti-démocratique de la Russie s'accentue. Les fondations Open Society et instituts affiliés distribuant des bourses d'études sont désormais considérées comme «indésirables» car représentant «une menace pour la sécurité nationale».
La Russie cherche à se rapprocher de l’Occident au Proche-Orient mais sur le plan intérieur, les organisations occidentales continuent d’être considérées comme une menace pour le régime. Le parquet russe a ainsi décidé lundi de qualifier d'«indésirables» les Fondations Open Society (OSF) et autres associations affiliées, bannissant de fait toutes leurs activités en Russie. Il applique ainsi une loi «sur les organisations étrangères indésirables» car représentant une menace pour la sécurité du pays, adoptée en mai et entrée en vigueur début juillet. Toute association ainsi qualifiée voit ses bureaux fermés, ses fonds gelés et ses activités interdites. En cas d’infraction, son personnel, comme tout Russe acceptant de coopérer avec elle ou d’en recevoir des fonds, devient passible d’amendes ou de peines de prison pouvant aller jusqu’à six ans.



Créée en Russie par le milliardaire américain George Soros dans les années 90 pour aider à la construction d’une société postcommuniste, la fondation est depuis longtemps dans le collimateur des autorités russes, qui lui reprochent d’avoir financé les «révolutions de couleur» du début des années 2000 en Géorgie et en Ukraine. Moscou s’est également irrité des appels de Soros à sanctionner plus fermement la Russie pour son rôle dans la guerre qui déchire l’est de l’Ukraine depuis plus d’un an.



«Révolutions de couleur»



Open Society n’est pas la première ONG à faire les frais de la nouvelle législation. Dès la fin juillet, le parquet a ouvert une enquête contre douze associations, essentiellement américaines, dont le National Endowment for Democracy (NED), partiellement financé par le Congrès américain, l’International Republican Institute (IRI), proche des républicains américains, le National Democratic Institute (NDI), proche des démocrates et Freedom House, tous considérés par le Kremlin comme des acteurs de ces «révolutions de couleur» (rose, orange, ou autre). Premier à être puni, le NED est accusé par le ministère russe de la Justice «d’avoir dépensé des millions pour mettre en cause la légitimité des élections russes».







La loi sur les «organisations étrangères indésirables» était venue compléter une série de lois déjà destinées à étouffer toute contestation dans la société russe. La première d’entre elles, adoptée en 2012, est la loi «sur les agents de l’étranger», qui contraint les associations recevant des fonds de contributeurs étrangers à se déclarer comme «agent de l’étranger». Il s’agit d’une qualification stigmatisante, puisque cette formule était utilisée sous le communisme des années Brejnev pour disqualifier les «ennemis du peuple». Une centaine d’ONG en ont déjà pâti, dont Memorial, la plus connue, fondée par le prix Nobel de la paix Andreï Sakharov pour faire connaître la vérité sur les crimes du communisme.



Une série d’associations, dont Human Rights Watch, toujours présente en Russie, ont condamné les mesures prises contre Soros – dont l’ONG a distribué de très nombreuses bourses à des étudiants russes –, en accusant les autorités d’avoir pour but d'«étouffer tout débat» dans la société.

[Caduce62]

Et ça continue:

La Russie bannit les ONG du milliardaire américain George Soros

Une série d’associations, dont Human Rights Watch, toujours présente en Russie, ont condamné les mesures prises contre Soros – dont l’ONG a distribué de très nombreuses bourses à des étudiants russes –, en accusant les autorités d’avoir pour but d'«étouffer tout débat» dans la société.

NO PROBLEM !!
Faut donner les bourses d'études aux étudiants ukrainiens 

[Александр]

En plus, j'ai vu qu'ils expulsent les étudiants turcs de Russie . . .

[Александр]

Idem sur les produits turcs



Nataliya Vasilyeva [email=‏@NatVasilyevaAP]‏[/email]@NatVasilyevaAP                       
The Turkish food ban affects tomatoes, oranges etc but has spared Turkish nuts and lemons that Russia relies almost entirely on.

[Александр]

La pression sur l'Ukraine continue:

Russie. Les Ukrainiens seront désormais des étrangers comme les autres sur le sol russe

Un garde ukrainien au poste-frontière de Senkivka, à l’intersection entre l’Ukraine, la Russie et la biélorussie, le 2 juillet 2015.   PHOTO SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP

La Russie met fin au statut privilégié dont bénéficiaient jusqu’à présent les ressortissants ukrainiens.

A compter de ce mardi 1^er décembre 2015, les ressortissants ukrainiens séjournant en Russie sont considérés comme des étrangers à part entière, rapporte le journal russe Nezavissimaïa Gazeta. Jusque-là, les Ukrainiens bénéficiaient d’un “régime de séjour privilégié” qui leur donnait la possibilité de séjourner et de travailler en Russie sans aucune autorisation préalable, pendant une période de trois mois renouvelable.

Depuis le 1^er août 2015, les Ukrainiens devaient se conformer à la législation migratoire en vigueur et opter pour l’un des statuts juridiques existants : soit en obtenant une autorisation de travail, soit en déposant une demande d’asile, soit en demandant la citoyenneté russe et, en attendant, ils devaient être en possession d’un titre de séjour provisoire.

“Actuellement, 2,6 millions de ressortissants ukrainiens se trouvent en Russie, dont plus de 1 million d’habitants des régions du sud-est de l’Ukraine [le Donbass, où se déroule le conflit armé entre les Républiques autoproclamées et le gouvernement de Kiev]”, précise le journal.

Amende ou interdiction de territoire 

Ceux qui n’auraient pas effectué ces démarches risquent désormais une amende administrative allant de 2 000 à 5 000 roubles [de 28 à 71 euros], voire une expulsion pure et simple du territoire. “Si un étranger reste dans l’ombre, vit et travaille clandestinement en Russie, nous lui interdirons l’entrée dans notre pays, a déclaré Konstantin Romodanovski, le chef du Service fédéral des migrations russe (FMS), cité par le journal. Un an d’illégalité vaudra par exemple dix ans d’interdiction du territoire russe.

Depuis avril 2014, 404 000 Ukrainiens ont fait une demande d’asile en Russie, 265 000 ont demandé un titre de séjour, 151 000 ont obtenu une autorisation de travailler, et plus de 500 000 sont considérés comme des illégaux, selon les chiffres du FMS. Les réfugiés du conflit du Donbass continueront, quant à eux, à bénéficier d’un régime de séjour privilégié.

[Thuramir]

La pression sur l'Ukraine continue:

Russie. Les Ukrainiens seront désormais des étrangers comme les autres sur le sol russe

Ce n'est pas une pression à proprement parler, parce que c'est la remise en application d'une règle habituelle. L'ancienne règle était un reliquat de l'URSS.

[Александр]

Juste au moment où on approche de la mise en application de l'accord UE - Ukraine?
Drôle de coïncidence, non?

[Александр]

En attendant, résultat dû à la politique Russe (mais c'était déjà fait):

NATO suspends cooperation with Russia until Minsk agreements fully implemented, – Klimkin

NATO is not going to restore cooperation with the Russian Federation until Minsk agreements fully implemented.

           

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin at the press conference in Brussels stated this, reported UNIAN.



“NATO is not restoring cooperation with Russia in the way it used to be in the past. This message I received from every minister today”, – said the head of the Ministry.



Klimkin stated that the cooperation between NATO and Russia is necessary to avoid situations of NATO airspace violations by the Russian planes.



“Cooperation regarding military matters is entirely within the competence of the Alliance, but there is no chance to return to the previous level of cooperation”, – Klimkin said.



According to the Minister, the full performance of the Minsk agreements will be the sign for the restoration of cooperation between Russia and NATO.



As previously reported, the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine and Germany discussed the Russian failure of the Minsk agreements’ implementation.

[benoit77]

Petite info que j'avais totalement oublié, me faisant réfléchir sur l'attitude de Poutine à quelques mois de la présidentielle russe de 2016:

La présidentielle russe n'est pas en 2016 mais en 2018 suite à l'allongement du mandat votée par la douma :



"Le 26 novembre 2008, la Douma et le Conseil de la Fédération adoptent une révision constitutionnelle, proposée par Dmitri Medvedev, qui allonge la durée du mandat présidentiel de quatre à six ans. Cette mesure s'applique pour la première fois lors de l'élection présidentielle de 2012"
source: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pr%C3%A9sident_de_la_F%C3%A9d%C3%A9ration_de_Russie

Donc le "super président" n'est trop sous pression puisqu'il à encore 2 ans.

en parallèle je lis ceci et me demande où sont passé les 85% de plébiscite des derniers mois :
http://news.liga.net/news/politics/7572647-57_rossiyan_vidyat_putina_prezidentom_opros_levada_tsentra.htm

[Александр]

J'ai aussi vu les 57% sur twitter, je n'en croyais pas mes yeux.
Les russes commenceraient-ils à ouvrir les yeux?

En attendant (mais sans savoir ce que ça vaut):

UTL. Poutine « décortiqué » par Alain Colas



L'attitude de la Russie sur la scène mondiale est aujourd'hui une « préoccupation » qu'Alain Colas, historien à l'Université de Bretagne sud, a exposée lors de la conférence de l'UTL.






« Vladimir Poutine aime bien se mettre en scène dans la nature et il participe à la Cop 21. Est-il pour autant écolo ? ». Ce fut l'une des multiples questions posées à Alain Colas, historien, sur la personnalité du dirigeant russe, qu'il présentait lundi après-midi, au Juvénat, devant 150 adhérents de l'UTL. Selon Alain Colas, pour les communistes, « l'homme pouvait dominer la nature ». Khrouchtchev fit détourner l'eau des fleuves alimentant la mer d'Aral, au bénéfice de la culture du coton. « Aujourd'hui, cette mer est réduite à peau de chagrin ».

Le dégel des sols glacés

Depuis quelques années, le dégel des sols glacés de Sibérie libère carbone et méthane, renforçant l'effet de serre. La catastrophe de Tchernobyl est encore présente dans les esprits. « Un ministre de l'Environnement a été nommé. Cependant, la production d'hydrocarbures et d'énergie nucléaire demeurent des priorités de croissance, malgré la volonté affirmée de réduire la consommation d'énergie », analyse Alain Colas. Une autre question portait sur l'avenir de l'Ukraine. Le conférencier, pessimiste, pense que le blocage est maintenu sur le gaz distribué pour « obliger les Ukrainiens à abandonner le Donbass ». Cette volonté de contrôler « l'étranger proche » pour reconstituer l'empire inquiète aussi les républiques baltes.

Slavophile

Pour Alain Colas, Poutine réagit « en officier du KGB des années 60 ». À la tête d'un régime autoritaire, il considère les États-Unis comme l'ennemi. « Slavophile », il se tourne vers la Chine et l'Asie. « Voulant restaurer la puissance russe, il s'appuie sur l'armée, l'église orthodoxe et un nationalisme très majoritaire dans la population. Au Moyen-Orient, il protège le port de Tartous, sur la côte syrienne de Méditerranée, et soutient ses alliés traditionnels : Bachar al-Assad et l'Iran ». L'universitaire estime que seule la peur des attentats islamistes pourrait le rapprocher des occidentaux.





Et conséquence directe des sanctions:




Coupe du monde 2018 : La Russie admet du retard







Le ministre des Sports russe, Vitaly Mutko, a admis mercredi des retards dans les préparatifs de la Coupe du monde 2018, notamment les constructions d’hôtels, mais a assuré que les travaux sont néanmoins en «bonne voie». «On relève des retards de constructions d’hôtels dans bon nombre de régions car pour beaucoup ce sont des projets d’investissements», a-t-il déclaré. «La crise ne pouvait pas ne pas affecter les investisseurs», a ajouté le ministre qui parle d’une «situation compliquée» de l’économie russe, en raison des sanctions des pays occidentaux consécutives à la crise en Ukraine et de la baisse des prix du pétrole. Vitaly Mutko a ainsi déploré le fait que les difficultés économiques du pays aient ralenti les constructions d’hôtels dans certaines des onze villes hôtes de la compétition, notamment Kalinin­grad, Volgograd et Rostov. Il s’est toutefois voulu rassurant, affirmant : «L’ensemble des travaux conduit dans la cadre du programme de préparation des infrastructures, respecte les délais.»
Lequipe.fr

[benoit77]

Poutine à Erdogan : "tu vas voir ta gueule à la récré"

http://www.leparisien.fr/international/avion-abattu-les-turcs-vont-regretter-ce-qu-ils-ont-fait-menace-poutine-03-12-2015-5336035.php
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/12/03/vladimir-poutine-la-turquie-regrettera-d-avoir-abattu-un-bombardier-russe_4823257_3214.html

[Александр]

En gros, c'est ça.

Avion abattu: les Turcs "vont regretter ce qu'ils ont fait", prévient Poutine

La Russie "n'oubliera jamais" la destruction d'un avion militaire russe le 24 novembre au-dessus de la frontière syrienne et les Turcs "vont regretter ce qu'ils ont fait", a prévenu jeudi le président russe Vladimir Poutine.



"Nous n'oublierons jamais cette complicité avec les terroristes. Nous considèrerons toujours la trahison comme l'un des pires et des plus vils actes. Que ceux en Turquie qui ont tiré dans le dos de nos pilotes le sachent", a déclaré le président lors de son adresse annuelle devant les parlementaires, le gouvernement et les gouverneurs des régions de Russie.

"Je ne comprends pas pourquoi ils ont fait ça. Seul Allah le sait", a-t-il ajouté, suscitant les applaudissements de l'assemblée.

"Il semble qu'Allah ait décidé de punir la clique au pouvoir en Turquie en la privant de la raison et du bon sens".

"Il ne faut pas attendre de nous une réaction nerveuse, hystérique, dangereuse pour nous et pour le monde entier", a-t-il promis. "Nous n'allons pas brandir les armes".

"Mais si quelqu'un pense que pour un crime de guerre aussi lâche, le meurtre de nos concitoyens, ils en seront quittes avec des tomates ou des sanctions dans le secteur des travaux publics ou dans d'autres secteurs, ils se trompent lourdement. Ce n'est pas la dernière fois que nous leur rappellerons ce qu'ils ont fait, ni la dernière fois qu'ils vont regretter ce qu'ils ont fait", a-t-il menacé.

La Russie a mis en place une série de sanctions économiques contre la Turquie, visant principalement les secteurs de l'agriculture, des travaux publics, de l'énergie et du tourisme, en rétorsion à la destruction d'un avion russe le 24 novembre au-dessus de la frontière syrienne.

Depuis cet incident, le ton n'a cessé de monter entre les deux pays, l'armée russe accusant mercredi le président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan et sa famille d'être "impliqués" dans le trafic de pétrole avec le groupe Etat islamique.

"Nous savons qui en Turquie s'en met plein les poches et permet aux terroristes de gagner de l'argent en vendant du pétrole pillé en Syrie", a de nouveau déclaré M. Poutine, accusant Ankara d'avoir également soutenu les rebelles du Caucase du Nord dans les années 1990 et 2000 au moment où Moscou combattait les séparatistes tchétchènes.

Acte III scène II RT @AFP #BREAKING Erdogan dit que la Turquie a la preuve de la participation russe du commerce du pétrole de l'EI.


Rappel, c'était son annuel discours



Le guébiste promet de lutter contre la corruption, mais qui est assis dans la salle:

Le procureur Tchaïka, accusé de privatisation illégale

Quand Poutine mentionne le parquet général, les gens dans la salle sourient. Pensez-vous, pourquoi ? )))


Poutine parle de renforcer le système judiciaire. "Des groupes des droits de l'homme insistent pour nous devrions avoir des jurys de 12 personnes. Mais nous ne pouvons pas toujours trouver 12 personnes. »

Vrai qu'en Russie trouver 12 personnes est une tâche insurmontable.

Poutine : ".. armes russes modernes sont efficaces, la pratique de leur utilisation dans des conditions de guerre servira à les perfectionner"

Dans le Donbass?

« La Russie dans la première ligne de la lutte contre les terroristes ».
En Ukraine, il est certainement côté terroristes.


Tout le monde écoute la voix de son maître:



Il y en a un qui a du mal



Avant de "sombrer"



Mais bon, c'est son habitude aussi.

Bon allez, je vais en rester là.

[Александр]

Ah oui, une précision:
Pas un seul mot sur l'Ukraine, pourtant, les boevik se renforcent et n'ont pas retiré leurs armes.
L'OSCE l'a noté dans son rapport du 1ier décembre.

[Александр]

Message de Poutine: "16 photos des parties les plus ennuyeuses de 2015"

Le réseau a des photos des partisans du président Vladimir Poutine, ennuyé à l'écoute de son message à l'Assemblée fédérale.

Photos de certains bureaucrates dormaient sous les mots de Poutine, publiés dans la communauté BuzzFeed la Russie dans les réseaux sociaux et activement commentés par les utilisateurs.



































"Certains partis ... dès le début, en quelque sorte ne pas venir et une fois que vous comprenez très bien, de toute façon pas très amusant ici ... La musique ne jouent pas Les gens sont assis et regardent dans l'espace,.." - A noté la communauté.

"M. Poutine a également fermé les yeux! Pourquoi ne pas avoir ses photos avec ses yeux fermés et la bouche ouverte ???" Eh bien, je ne peux plus ... Medvedev est allé de nouveau au sommeil. Donc, en fait, il s'est encore endormi, "- a commenté des utilisateurs.

[Thuramir]

Juste au moment où on approche de la mise en application de l'accord UE - Ukraine?
Drôle de coïncidence, non?

Ce que je voulais dire, c'est que c'est voulu comme une mesure de rétorsion dans le contexte actuel, mais qu'en fait, l'ancien statut est un statut totalement inhabituel, et qui n'est pas le statut standard alloué aux étrangers tous les Etats du monde (sauf accord particulier comme dans l'UE). En fait, la Russie met fin à un statut hérité de l'URSS dans un contexte de crise entre les deux pays.

[Matt]

Ca, j'avais compris, mais tu confirme mon opinion, c'est bien une mesure de rétorsion.

A se demander si le guébiste connait autre chose? Cfr la Turquie actuellement (par exemple).

[Caduce62]

C'est le nouveau père Noël russe ou le père fouettard 

[Contenu sponsorisé]